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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers, practitioners, and academics have long brought attention 
to unjustified variations in criminal justice outcomes.1 A principal focus is on 
disparities in sentencing practices because of the perception that 
inconsistencies in penalties are indicative of disproportionality in penalty 
outcomes, an abuse of discretion, and potential discrimination.2 An additional 
concern today is America’s evolution into a state of mass incarceration with 
too many individuals being sent to prison and for longer periods of time.3 To 
investigate the possible existence of disparities, researchers from diverse 
academic disciplines have undertaken a host of studies.4  
                                                 
* Visiting Criminal Law Scholar, University of Houston Law Center; J.D., The 
University of Texas at Austin School of Law; Ph.D, The University of Texas at Austin 
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1 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4 (1996). 
2 Cassia Spohn, Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform Movement: Looking Backward, 
Moving Forward, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 537 (2014). 
3 CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF 
IMPRISONMENT 61 (2006). 
4 See generally Leslie Sebba, Is Sentencing Reform a Lost Cause? A Historical 
Perspective on Conceptual Problems in Sentencing Research, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
237 (2013). 
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Nevertheless, there is much still to be learned. Serious gaps exist in the 
empirical legal studies literature regarding certain sentencing practices. The 
modal approaches to sentencing research is to focus on the in/out decision 
(i.e., whether the penalty requires any time of imprisonment) and sentence 
length.5 Yet, there are other types of sentencing decisions that deserve more 
attention as they may also substantively exacerbate disparities in outcomes 
while contributing to mass incarceration. Then, more sophisticated empirical 
methodologies are available today that permit researchers to better specify 
statistical models to improve fit to the data and reduce the potential for biases 
in the results. Plus, there is perhaps insufficient attention to regional 
variations in sentencing practices.  
This Article contributes to the literature by producing an empirical study 
focusing on sentences that constitute upward departures from sentencing 
guidelines. In particular, federal sentencing is a guidelines-based system, 
with upward departures issued at the discretion of district judges. Decisions 
to depart upward are uniquely remarkable because they obviously lead to 
lengthier prison terms, may represent gaps in the guidelines, and may signify 
disparities—potentially discrimination—in sentencing decisions. The federal 
system is worthy of analysis as it often acts as a role model for criminal justice 
practices, it operates the largest prison system in the country in terms of the 
number of inmates held, and it represents sentencing decisions across the 
country. 
To date, no research appears to have discretely concentrated on upward 
departure decisions in federal sentencing. The results presented herein are 
meant to address this void. This study takes advantage of multilevel modeling 
as the empirical methodology, which constitutes a more sophisticated model 
of statistical analysis than is used in most criminal justice research.6 The 
study also responds to a call for more research on court-level factors in 
judicial decisionmaking.7 In the federal system, individual defendants are 
nested (i.e., clustered) within groups at a higher level, being district courts. It 
is hypothesized that unique courtroom workgroups within district courts 
result in sentencing practices that differ across districts. Multilevel modeling, 
explained further herein, provides the ability to investigate how certain 
                                                 
5 Travis W. Franklin et al., Extralegal Disparity in the Application of Intermediate 
Sanctions: An Analysis of U.S. District Courts, CRIME & DELINQ. (forthcoming) [hereinafter 
Franklin et al., Intermediate Sanctions]. 
6 Most studies rely upon single-level regression models. Jose Pina-Sánchez & Robin 
Linacre, Refining the Measurement of Consistency in Sentencing: A Methodological Review, 
44 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 68, 78 tbl.1 (2016). For more information on the potential 
limitations on single-level models, see the methodological Appendix. 
7 Rob Tillyer & Richard Hartley, The Use and Impact of Fast-Track Departures: 
Exploring Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion in Federal Immigration Cases, 62 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 1624, 1640 (2016). 
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predictor factors are related to upward departures in individual cases while 
also testing whether the effects of those same factors differ among districts.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the federal sentencing 
guidelines system. It then turns to upward departures specifically to 
contextualize the many reasons they represent extraordinary decision points 
worthy of scrutiny. Section III reviews contested issues concerning whether 
disparities are ever warranted and specifically addresses the challenge of 
regional disparities. Two theoretical views on disparities are relevant. The 
focal concerns perspective demonstrates that individual penalties tend to be 
based on perceptions of the defendant’s culpability, the defendant’s risk of 
recidivism, and the practical consequences of the potential punishment. In 
turn, the courtroom communities’ perspective indicates that judges and 
practitioners in courtroom workgroups develop their own unique traditions 
and routines, which can explain some variations between courts in sentencing 
outcomes. Next, a literature review summarizes the results of prior empirical 
research on federal sentencing practices. The preexisting research was 
informative to building the statistical models presented herein.  
Section IV sets forth an original empirical study of upward departure 
decisions. The data and variables are explained and the results from the 
multilevel models on upward departures are provided. In sum, the results 
demonstrate a statistically significant variance between district courts on 
upward departure outcomes. In a full model, a host of legal factors (e.g., final 
offense level, criminal history, offense type), extralegal characteristics (e.g., 
gender, race/ethnicity, citizenship), and case-processing variables (e.g., 
custody status) are predictive of upward departure outcomes in individual 
cases. Yet the influence of most of them varies across district courts, 
suggesting regional disparities in outcomes. The implications of the findings 
regarding factors correlated with individual outcomes and regional disparities 
are discussed in more detail. The results also substantively support the focal 
concerns and courtroom communities’ perspectives. A methodological 
Appendix attached hereto further demonstrates the empirical benefits of a 
multilevel regression modeling approach and describes foundational 
decisions underlying the final results reported in the main text. 
II.  HISTORY AND CURRENT GUIDELINES PRACTICES 
This Article reports an original study using a sophisticated empirical 
modeling strategy to explore decisionmaking in criminal penalties. More 
specifically, the study is of discretionary upward departure outcomes in the 
federal sentencing system. A focus on criminal justice research specifically 
at the federal level is meaningful for several key reasons. In contemporary 
times, federal authorities act as a role model in the administration of justice. 
[The federal government] provides resources, collects and develops 
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best practices, and serves as the communicator and facilitator of 
these best practices throughout the country. . . . Because state, local, 
and tribal governments are limited by the need to devote resources 
to solving problems unique and endemic to their particular 
jurisdictions, the [f]ederal government plays [an] explicit role[] in 
advancing public policy to respond to gathering threats.8  
Congress itself is often perceived as a leader in setting the criminal justice 
policy agenda for the country.9 With respect to the federal government 
influencing sentencing decisions, the Justice Department at times has used 
funding programs to encourage states to adopt federally-based sentencing 
practices, such as determinate penalties and sentencing enhancements.10 In 
addition, the federal sentencing guideline structure has been a model for the 
states who have adopted guideline systems.  
Still, the federal guidelines are known for their extraordinary 
complexity11 and are considered the most detailed12 and constraining13 ever 
developed in the country. The federal guidelines clearly were meant to 
restrain discretion in sentencing. The complex and detailed nature of the 
federal Guidelines mean that departures from them may provide particularly 
significant information about relevant predictors in this type of discretionary 
decisionmaking.14 The potential to observe seeming disparities, even 
possibly implicit discrimination, is therefore informative to those interested 
in fairness, consistency, and transparency in decisions regarding 
punishments. Studies on federal sentencing also offer a benefit of 
representing judicial decisions across the country, thus perhaps making the 
results more generalizable than would research on a single state or 
subdivision of a state. 
                                                 
8 NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASSOC, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION 3 (2005), available at http://www.ncja.org/issues-and-legislation/role-
federal-govt-administration-justice/role-federal-govt-administration. 
9 Jerold Israel, Federal Influence in State Cases: Sentencing, Prosecution, and 
Procedure, 543 ANNALS 130, 131 (1996). 
10 John F. Pfaff, Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants 
and State Imprisonment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1571 (2015); Lisa L. Miller, Looking for 
Post-Modernism in all the Wrong Places, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 172 (2001). 
11 James C. Oleson et al., The Sentencing Consequences of Federal Pretrial Supervision, 
63 CRIME & DELINQ. 313, 315 (2017). 
12 Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity, 90 CRIMINOLOGY 239, 240 (1999) [hereinafter Hofer at al., Sentencing 
Guidelines]. 
13 Ben Grunwald, Questioning Blackmun’s Thesis: Does Uniformity Sentencing Entail 
Unfairness, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 499, 500 (2015). 
14 Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law: Exploring the Risk of 
Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 435, 445 (2002). 
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There is another significant way that the federal system has influence on 
the evolution of criminal justice responses in the country. In part due to what 
some critics perceive as overcriminalization in Congress’ enactment of scores 
of new federal criminal laws over the last few decades,15 the federal 
government now operates the single largest criminal justice system by inmate 
count in the United States.16 Indeed, the federal prison system itself is among 
the top ten largest by country in the world.17  
To situate the context of this study on upward departure decisions, a brief 
summary of the federal guidelines system is offered. Then the discussion 
outlines the case for why upward departures are noteworthy discretionary 
decisions that offer a valuable subject for research. 
A.  Primer on Federal Guidelines 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the federal sentencing system 
represented an indeterminate structure that awarded federal district judges 
broad discretion to determine criminal penalties in individual cases.18 By the 
1970s, however, critics objected. Complainants alleged that the indeterminate 
structure led to unappealing results, such as too lenient sentences for certain 
offenses, disparities in sentences among similarly-situated offenders, and 
discrimination against minority defendants.19 In its place, the country’s 
politicians across the country embarked in the 1980s on a mission to enact 
more determinate policies.20  
Congress was at the forefront of the country’s reform movement in the 
latter part of the twentieth century by adopting legislation which mandated 
more regimented sentencing practices. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
created a presumptive sentencing system to be engineered under the auspices 
of a newly formed United States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission” 
                                                 
15 Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds can Learn from the 
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 524-27 (2011). 
16 NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RES. SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 
BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2016). 
17 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN PRISON 1 (2015) 
(noting 210,567 inmates in federal prison as of February 2015, with 185,644 of them serving 
a federal sentence). The 185,644 figure just given represents the nine largest in the world 
following China, Russia, Brazil, India, Thailand, Mexico, Iran, and Turkey. See INT’L 
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON BRIEF http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-
lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All. 
18 Ilene H. Nagel, Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOLGY 883, 893 (1990). 
19 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1993).  
20 Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA, 1975–2025, at 141, 159–60 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013). 
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or “Sentencing Commission”).21 A dramatic and holistic reform ordered the 
Commission develop a determinate system of sentencing guidelines 
(“Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) to systematize sentencing 
outcomes principally by restraining judicial discretion. “Proponents of this 
package hoped that it would end judge-to-judge and region-to-region 
disparities, promote candor in sentencing, and provide judges with relative 
values in sentences.”22 
An unforeseen and significant development recast how the Guidelines 
were to operate. Despite Congress’ intent for a presumptive Guidelines 
system, the United States Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in 
nature. In the seminal case of United States v. Booker in 2005, the Court 
found that the system operated in an unconstitutional manner because judges, 
rather than juries, were the arbiters of facts that increased sentence length.23 
Bestowing advisory status was the Supreme Court’s remedial fix to avoid 
overturning the entire Guidelines system.24  
The Booker fix did not, however, return to the judiciary the wide 
discretion that existed pre-Guidelines. In a series of cases since then, the 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that federal judges remain significantly 
circumscribed by the Commission’s Guidelines and policies.25  
At their heart, the Guidelines provide for a series of calculations in order 
to determine the defendant’s offense severity level and criminal history score. 
With these two numbers in hand, the district judge consults a single 
Guidelines grid to obtain the recommended prison sentence.26 The grid is not 
the end of the decisionmaking process though. Once the Guidelines-
recommended penalty for the individual defendant is determined, the judge 
considers whether any departure provision contained in the Guidelines may 
apply.27 Guidelines-based departures may be downward or upward, meaning 
either that they would justify a sentence below or above, respectively, from 
the recommendation. The Guidelines contain a number of provisions which 
the Commission staff acknowledges are circumstances that may not be 
adequately covered in the offense severity and criminal history provisions. 
Two of the downward departures expressly require the affirmative motion of 
the government to justify them.28  
                                                 
21 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-300, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-
2040.  
22 Frank H. Easterbrook, Introduction, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1989). 
23 The Court ruled that such judicial factfinding violated the Sixth Amendment. 543 U.S. 
220, 245 (2005). 
24 543 U.S. at 249. 
25 Peugh v. United States, 186 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (2013). 
26 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL ch. 5 pt. A, sent’g tbl. (2015). 
27 Id. at § 1B1.1(b). 
28 These are substantial assistance to authorities in investigating another potential 
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The Guidelines expressly provide for several types of upward departures, 
all of which are discretionary to the judge and do not require the prosecutor’s 
request.29 An example given for an approved upward departure (and one that 
is relevant to the results of the study provided herein) addresses the 
inadequacy of the computed criminal history category to properly reflect the 
defendant’s deviant past.30 Reasons specified for why the judge may find the 
official criminal history category inadequate include the existence of prior 
similar conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction or when a prior sentence 
was not officially computed in the criminal history calculation (e.g., the prior 
sentence was too dated and thus was excluded from the official calculation).31 
Per the statutory framework and Guidelines policy, a judge may also 
depart for reasons not included in the Guidelines if “there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the Guidelines.”32 Judges may reject the recommendation for 
other reasons, including, according to the Supreme Court in a case following 
Booker, based on a direct policy dispute with a relevant Guideline or 
Commission policy.33 Nevertheless, the Guidelines preclude consideration of 
the defendant’s race, sex, national origin, and socioeconomic status.34 
In the end, a district judge in the individual case must determine a penalty 
that is reasonable and parsimonious, one that comprises “a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”35 The penultimate step, then, is for 
the judge to reflect upon whether a within-Guidelines or, alternatively, a non-
                                                 
offender (§ 5K1.1) and fast-track departures as a docket-clearing option (§ 5K3.1) 
29 Technically, there are two types of upwardly varying sentences in the federal system. 
A “departure” is a term used in the Guidelines which refers to a sentence outside the 
recommended range from the sentencing grid but permitted by the Guidelines rules. United 
States v. Jeffers, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132055, at *21-22 (N.D. Iowa 2015). A “variance” 
is a non-Guidelines sentence invoked to achieve statutory sentencing goals. Id. The 
difference between them is not of consequence here and the Article uses “upward departure” 
generally to signify both of them.  
30 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 4A1.3. 
31 Id. at § 4A1.3. 
32 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2015). 
33 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108-11 (2007). 
34 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL §4H1.10 (2015). 
35 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The legislation specifies that district judges consider the 
following factors in determining a reasonable sentence in the individual case: (a) the 
recommended punishment range set by the sentencing guidelines and the Commission’s 
policy statements; (b) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; (d) the need for the sentence imposed considering the 
seriousness of the offense, retribution, deterrence, protecting the public, and the offender’s 
rehabilitative needs; and (e) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
similarly-situated offenders. Id. 
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Guidelines penalty is proper.36 Then she pronounces the sentence. 
The existence of  greater discretion afforded by Booker have led empirical 
researchers to study how discretion is used and whether differences in 
sentencing outcomes across judges and districts may be a repercussion.37 The 
study of potential disparities herein focuses on upward departure decisions 
for the reasons that are outlined next. 
B.  The Significance of Upward Departures 
It is curious that there appear to be no other empirical studies 
comprehensively concentrating on upward departures in the federal system. 
Departures upward are extraordinary and consequential decisions for many 
reasons. First, an upward departure obviously is meant to increase the 
severity of the penalty. Prior studies in federal sentencing confirm such a 
result, and they demonstrate that the consequences are significant. Regression 
studies have found that the decision to upwardly depart multiplied the odds 
of a sentence involving incarceration by as much as 12 times compared to a 
sentence without an upward departure.38 Regression results have also 
indicated that an upward departure as much as doubles the length of the 
resulting prison sentence.39  
Second, to the extent that upward departures naturally leads to a greater 
number of defendants being incarcerated and for longer periods, these 
decisions worsen the federal system’s prison overpopulation problem. Since 
1980, the federal prison population has grown 750%.40 As a result, the federal 
                                                 
36 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
37 WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING DISPARITY: 2005-2012, at *6 (2015). 
38 Brian D. Johnson & Sara Betsinger, Punishing the “Model Minority”: Asian-
American Criminal Sentencing Outcomes in Federal District Courts, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 
1045, 1067 tbl. 3 (2009). See also Travis W. Franklin, Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. District 
Courts: Can Offenders’ Educational Attainment Guard against Prevalent Criminal 
Stereotypes, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 137, 151 tbl. 2 (2017) [hereinafter Franklin, Educational 
Attainment] (finding upward departures increased the odds of incarceration by 11 times and 
increased sentence length by 83%); Travis W. Franklin, Sentencing Native Americans in US 
Federal Courts: An Examination of Disparity, 30 JUST. Q. 310, 326 tbl. 2 (2013) (finding 
upward departures increased the odds of incarceration by a factor of seven). 
39 Tillyer & Hartley, supra note 7, at 1635 tbl. 2 (obtained by anti-logging the coefficient 
of .71); Jeffery Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity: Changes in Federal 
Sentencing After Booker and Gall?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 336 tbl. 2 (2011); Ben 
Feldmeyer & Jeffery T. Ulmer, Racial/Ethnic Threat and Federal Sentencing, 48 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 252 tbl. 3 (2011); Celesta A. Albonetti & Robert D. Baller, 
Sentencing in Federal Drug Trafficking/Manufacturing Cases: A Multilevel Analysis of 
Extra-Legal Defendant Characteristics, Guidelines Departures, and Continuity of Culture, 
14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 41, 68 tbl. 3 (2010) (studying drug trafficking cases).  
40 SAMUEL A. TAXY, DRIVERS OF GROWTH IN THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 1 
(2015), available at http://www.urban.org/research/publication/drivers-growth-federal-
prison-population. 
Draft]             7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) 9 
prison system is challenged by the resulting increases in costs of 
imprisonment and is dangerously overcrowded.41 An Urban Institute report 
has tagged longer sentences as contributing to over half of the growth in the 
federal prison system.42 Upward departure outcomes—whether considered 
legitimate or not—exacerbate these tensions. 
Third, upward departures uniquely signal that judges may be finding gaps 
in Guidelines policies and calculations, despite the Commission’s now 
decades of experience with studying sentencing practices and making 
relevant policy adjustments as needed. When a judge determines whether to 
depart upward from the Guidelines recommendation, it likely represents a 
compromise between uniformity and proportionality. Whereas downward 
departures are often for reasons other than proportionality concerns (for 
example, the repeated use of fast-track departures and substantial assistance 
departures are mainly for efficient case-processing purposes), upward 
departures are more attuned to calibrating the penalty to the defendant’s 
culpability and harm. Upward departures are even more surprising as many 
judges, practitioners, and researchers already assess the Guidelines as 
producing excessively harsh sentence recommendations as a general rule.43 
Thus, upward departures appear to be exceptions to the rule about the 
sufficiency (or tendency toward excessiveness) of Guidelines-based 
proportionality judgments.  
Fourth, because upward departures are relatively rare, it is therefore even 
more symbolic when one is issued in an individual case.44 An upward 
departure constitutes individualized sentencing since it is an ad hoc, 
discretionary decision. The rare upward departure may, then, be acutely felt 
as unforeseeable and unfair, perhaps even arbitrary. These perceptions 
challenge the integrity of the system. Notably, a judge issuing a sentence that 
constitutes an upward departure does not do so by mistake or in ignorance. 
The Commission requires district courts to complete a Statement of Reasons 
form for each sentence which includes several fields where an upward 
                                                 
41 See generally NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RES. SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2016).  
42 KAMALA MALLIK-KANE ET AL., EXAMINING GROWTH IN THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION, 1998 TO 2010, at *10 (2012), available at 
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/examining-growth-federal-prison-population-
1998-2010. 
43 Byungbae Kim et al., The Impact of United States v. Booker and Gall/Kimbrough v. 
United States on Sentence Severity: Assessing Social Context and Judicial Discretion, 62 
CRIME & DELINQ. 1072, 1075 (2016); Cassia Spohn, Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform 
Movement: Looking Backward, Moving Forward, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 538 
(2014). 
44 Upward departures occur in three percent of cases. Data obtained from the 
Commission’s annual sourcebooks. 
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departure box must be checked (when applicable) and further justified.45  
An upward departure is also a particularly risky choice. In part because 
of its rarity and in part because of the substantive due process rights afforded 
criminal defendants, an upward departure practically invites the defendant to 
appeal. On review, the upward departure decision may well be overturned, 
particularly if the appellate court finds that the district judge did not provide 
sufficient reasons for the higher sentence.46 
Fifth, upward departures are surprising, too, as they violate the premise 
underlying the cognitive bias of anchoring.47 Anchoring effects refer to a 
person’s tendency when making numbers-based judgments to rely on 
numeric reference points.48 Anchoring is an example of a psychological 
heuristic in providing a shortcut to more efficient decisionmaking by tuning 
the person’s thought process toward the given anchor number.49 The 
Guidelines are generally considered to be substantive anchors for sentencing 
decisions.50 An upward departure, then, requires the particular judge to reject 
the anchor and thereby lose the value of the cognitive shortcut. A 
discretionary decision to depart imposes a further resource cost upon the 
judge issuing it because of the burden to justify it in writing in the Statement 
of Reasons and in a way that distinguishes the case from the heartland already 
covered by the Guidelines.51  
                                                 
45 See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum & Paul J. Hofer, The Evolution of the Statement 
of Reasons Form, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 169 (2016).  
46 See e.g., United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 2014) (vacating upward 
departure as district court’s judgment about defendant’s criminal past insufficient to support 
it); United States v. Espinoza, 550 Fed. Appx. 690 (11th Cir. 2013) (vacating upward 
departure as district court did not adequately justify it); United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 
174 (5th Cir. 2009) (vacating upward departure as district judge erred in analyzing whether 
the defendant’s conduct met the Guidelines-based departure provision); United States v. 
Dillon, 355 Fed. Appx. 732 (4th Cir. 2009) (remanding sentence a second time as sentencing 
judge did not adequately explain its justification); United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing upward variance where reasons given not compelling enough for 
an extraordinary variance). 
47 Silvio Aldrovandia et al., Sentencing, Severity, and Social Norms: A Rank-Based 
Model of Contextual Inﬂuence on Judgments of Crimes and Punishments, 144 ACTA 
PSCHYOLOGICA 538, 546 (2013). 
48 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numerical Judgments: 
Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 695 (2015). 
49 Bettina von Helversen & Jörg Rieskamp, Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level 
Crimes: Comparing Models of Human Judgment, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 375, 379 
(2009). 
50 See generally Melissa Hamilton, Extreme Prison Sentences: Legal and Normative 
Consequences, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 59 (2016) [hereinafter Hamilton, Extreme Sentences] 
(reviewing literature on anchoring effects, providing an empirical study on anchoring effects 
of Guidelines recommendations on sentencing outcomes, and concluding anchoring exists in 
federal sentencing practices). 
51 See Andrew W. Nutting, The Booker Decision and Discrimination in Federal 
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Sixth, it is widely recognized that departure decisions as a general rule 
(upward and downward) are significant, if not primary, sources of perceived 
disparities in sentencing.52 If judges depart from Guidelines 
recommendations too often or for inappropriate reasons, they may be 
thwarting the main purpose of the implementation of the Guidelines system 
of reducing unwarranted disparities.53 Upward departures, unlike some 
downward departures, do not require a prosecutorial motion, and thereby 
provide a mechanism for which judicial discretion unequivocally impacts 
sentencing severity. Plus, when such discretion is based on extralegal (i.e., 
not legally or formally permissible) reasons, the resulting judgments may 
even implicate implicit race, gender, or class discrimination. Importantly, 
researchers have previously tied extralegal factors to decisions that deviate 
from the Guidelines.54 
This suggested relationship between upward departures and discretion is 
highlighted by the likely impact of the Booker decision (granting judges 
greater discretionary ability) on the rate of upward departures. The year after 
Booker, the rate of upward departures doubled compared to the annual rate 
of upward departures in the decade preceding the decision.55 The rate of 
upward departures is now (i.e., fiscal years 2014-2015) at three times the pre-
Booker rate.56 Since the Booker decision (through the end of fiscal year 
2015), federal judges have upwardly departed from Guidelines’ 
recommendations in over 15,000 cases.57 As another empirical verification 
of the role of discretion (possibly even discrimination), a substantial majority 
of these upward departures after Booker, as reported by judges themselves in 
the Statement of Reasons, are based on grounds other than the upward 
departure policies explicitly permitted by the Guidelines.58  
                                                 
Criminal Sentences, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 637, 641 (2013). 
52 Jawjeong Wu & Cassia Spohn, Interdistrict Disparity in Sentencing in Three U.S. 
District Courts, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 290, 296-97 (2010); Brian D. Johnson, Jeffery T. 
Ulmer, & John H. Kramer, The Social Context of Guidelines Circumvention: The Case of 
Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737, 740 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Social 
Context]; Hofer at al., Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 12, at 240. 
53 Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An 
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996). 
54 Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: 
An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1077, 
1080 (2011); Johnson et al., Social Context, supra note 52, at 740. 
55 Data analyses done by author using the Commission’s data files from fiscal years 
1999-2015 and the Commission’s annual Sourcebooks for fiscal years 1989-2015. 
56 U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2015 Sourcebook tbl. N; 2008 Sourcebook tbl. N; 2006 
Sourcebook tbl. N. 
57 Results from the author’s frequency distribution analysis run of the Commission’s 
datasets. 
58 The conclusion is derived from the Commission’s annual Sourcebooks from fiscal 
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Thus far, it has been argued that upward departures in federal sentencing 
are worthy of further analysis. The study was also led by relevant normative 
and theoretical foundations and informed by the results of previous studies. 
III.  NORMATIVE, THEORETICAL, AND RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
The issue of disparities in sentencing practices is not a simple concept 
and not all agree on either whether it is necessarily a bad result. Challenges 
presented by potential disparities in penalties are discussed next. Then the 
Section reviews two major theoretical viewpoints relevant to the research 
herein, which are referred to as the focal concerns perspective and the 
courtroom workgroup perspective. Following that is a concise empirical 
literature review of relevant studies of federal sentencing practices. 
A.  Disparity Issues 
The Sentencing Commission clearly values national uniformity in case-
processing and outcomes.59 While the tenets of federalism philosophically 
permit criminal laws to vary by state, federal criminal law is expected to 
provide a single set of policies regarding the official reaction to offenders 
who commit crimes that are of national interest.60 Guidelines are expressly 
meant to provide a normative function.61 Indeed, the federal Guidelines have 
over their thirty year existence become embedded in the legal, political, and 
organizational cultures of federal court communities.62  
The Commission is not the only institution that works to normalize 
federal sentencing practices across judicial districts. The U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Judicial Center are also centralized authorities 
providing educational opportunities to socialize judges into the federal 
government’s sentencing policies.63 Offering frequent training in the form of 
written primers, face-to-face instructional classes, and web-based videos64 
are necessary because of the complexity of the Guidelines. The 2015 
                                                 
years 2008-2015.  
59 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL ch. I, Pt. A, at 1.3 (2015) (“Congress sought 
reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed 
for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT A-3 (2014). 
60 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137, 137 (2005). 
61 RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 23 n. 19. 
62 Ulmer & Light, supra note 39, at 340. 
63 Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. 
District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 256-57 
(2005) [hereinafter Ulmer, Localized Uses]. 
64 For a glimpse into the various instructional offerings, see the Commission’s training 
website: http://www.ussc.gov/topic/training. 
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Guidelines Manual is just shy of 600 pages,65 with hundreds, if not thousands, 
of rules, depending on how one parses the rule counting scheme. The 
unavoidable purpose for such complexity is to try to leave as little uncovered 
as possible and thus to correct for potential lapses. Consistent with such 
intent, the Commission asserts that the primary goal of the sentencing 
Guidelines was to “eliminate” (i.e., implying not just reduce) unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.66  
Though not all stakeholders would concur, it is not always clear what 
disparity means and whether it is necessarily a bad thing. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, disparity means “inequality” and “a difference in 
quantity or quality between two or more things.”67 The first meaning 
(inequality) tends to have a negative connotation, at least in criminal justice 
circumstances. The second (oriented around differences) does not necessarily 
carry an adverse inference. Such competing alternatives to the implication of 
using the term disparity similarly complicates the discussion in criminal 
justice circles. 
When observers discuss disparity in sentencing outcomes, it is often 
based on identifying like individuals who commit like offenses.68 Disparity 
in this sense might be viewed as the flipside of uniformity in which the 
posited individuals received similar punishments. An obvious critique of 
these philosophical notions is that there is no objective criteria for 
determining what exactly constitutes like individuals or like offenses. With 
the complexity of human nature and conduct, no individual or deed can truly 
be identical. 
In any event, the Guidelines—despite Booker—remain the lodestone of 
federal sentencing practices.69 Still, many sources are again concerned with 
perceived disparities in actual sentencing decisions.70 What do they tend to 
consider is wrong with disparities in punishment? Rationales are that 
differences in punishment for like offenses erodes the public confidence in 
an expectedly legal, objective, and rational system,71 and that they bring 
gratuitous uncertainty and unfairness72 for defendants, victims, the 
                                                 
65 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL (2015). 
66 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 79 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEARS]. 
67 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
68 RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 7. 
69 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 3 (2015). 
70 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONTINUING IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING F-9 (2012) (citing sources). 
71 Mandeep K. Dhami et al., Quasirational Models of Sentencing, 4 J. APPLIED RES. 
MEMORY & COGNITION 239, 242 (2015). 
72 FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 38.  
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government, and the public.  
The posited problems with disparities are particularly acute when judges 
base sentences on extralegal factors that the Guidelines were intended to 
more proactively forbid.73 Some argue that empirical evidence of differential 
sentencing practices based on demographic factors is obviously indicative of 
illegal discrimination.74 Their issue is not just with overtly discriminatory 
practices. The Booker decision increased ambiguity in the exact reasons for 
district court decisions and thereby multiplied the potential for implicit 
discrimination, meaning unconscious and unintentional discrimination in 
individual cases.75 Thus, implicit discrimination might arguably be present 
when studies show that females and whites, for instance, routinely receive 
lesser punishments than males and blacks, respectively, after controlling for 
relevant legal factors.76 Variations in sentencing practices may be signs not 
only of inequality and injustice, they also undermine the deterrence value of 
predictable and firm sentencing policies.77 
Nonetheless, it is still reasonable to acknowledge that not all variances 
from Guidelines recommendations constitute disparities, particularly in the 
negative sense of the term. Prior statisticians reviewing federal sentencing 
data rightly observe that a non-Guidelines-compliant sentence is not 
necessarily illegal considering the discretion that judges now lawfully 
maintain to deviate per Booker.78 Further, as an appellate judge reasonably 
stated, “while a strictly code-based method of legal problem-solving might 
work to achieve predictability and some sort of uniformity, it does not always 
work to achieve justice.”79 The inability or unwillingness of a judge to depart 
from the Guidelines may inequitably mean there is an inordinate amount of 
rigidity in sentencing requirements.80 Hence, a reciprocal danger of 
unwarranted disparity to notions of justice is unwarranted uniformity. 
There may well be something extraordinary in a particular case where a 
judge’s discretionary ability could work to better serve justice for all parties.81 
                                                 
73 J.C. Oleson, Blowing out the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 RICH. L. REV. 693, 755 (2011). 
74 Pina-Sánchez & Linacre, supra note 6, at 72; Hofer at al., Sentencing Guidelines, 
supra note 12, at 242. 
75 Nutting, supra note 51, at 638-39. 
76 Id. at 645. 
77 Bibas, supra note 60, at 137. 
78 RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 18. 
79 Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
905, 918 (2007). 
80 Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An 
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996). 
81 Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using Empirical 
Research to Inform the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
433, 438-39 (2007). 
Draft]             7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) 15 
Some commentators thus point out the desirability of individualizing 
penalties.82 Likely, balancing is the key. There is some value in providing 
judges some discretionary ability in determining penalties to account for 
exceptional circumstances, even if there is also value in channeling or 
controlling that discretion to avoid abuses.83  
In the end, this paper does not take the concrete position that even 
sophisticated statistical analyses of sentencing outcomes can prove that every 
upward departure represents disparity, at least to the extent the term holds a 
negative connotation, much less a discriminatory decision. Nor does the 
paper assign condemnatory blame to district judges for differences in 
sentencing for seemingly comparable offenses or offenders. As with any 
study of human behavior, no dataset can possibly account for all aspects of 
criminal conduct or of decisionmaking. Thus, different judges may sentence 
seemingly similar offenders to incomparable punishments for legitimate 
reasons that are simply not captured in the data.  
Further, the source of any unwarranted disparity may arise from other 
actors anyway, such as based on the (legitimate or illegitimate) practices and 
decisions of other actors in the criminal justice process chain.84  Research has 
shown that prosecutors can finesse facts in their case filings and to manipulate 
the offense(s) charged and/or the specific offense characteristics on which the 
Guidelines computation is based.85 Contributions to differences in sentencing 
outcomes may also derive from inconsistent policies in policing or in the 
preparation of presentence reports by probation officers.86 Disparities in 
outcomes for otherwise seemingly similar offenders may likewise depend 
upon the diverse competencies of defense counsel with respect to their grasp 
of the complex Guidelines system.87  
Despite the choice not to assume all differences in outcomes establish 
unwarranted disparities, the observation that “some patterns in those 
differences are suggestive of disparity”88 in its more negative sense appears 
reasonable. What the study herein can do is to parse the patterns of 
                                                 
82 Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1631, 1648 
(2012); W.H. Townsend, The Punishment of Crime, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIME & CRIMINOLOGY 
533, 535 (1920) (“Individualization is the process of adjusting a penalty to the character of 
a criminal. The criterion of judgment is threefold, including the crime, social conditions, and 
the criminal.”). 
83 Stuart S. Nagel, Discretion in the Criminal Justice System: Analyzing, Channeling, 
Reducing and Controlling It, 31 EMORY L.J. 603, 609 (1982). 
84 Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic 
Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514, 517 (2014). 
85 RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 7.  
86 FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 84. 
87 Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 445 
(2002). 
88 RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 18 (emphasis in original). 
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differences in the outcomes of upward departures (versus not) that might 
imply these disparities. 
B.  Regional Differences 
Another disparity matter needs to be addressed considering the study 
contained herein will focus on it: regional variations in sentencing outcomes. 
The issue here is where sentencing outcomes may be uniformly meted out 
within a region but vary from those in other regions. Regional disparities are 
viewed by some observers in unfavorable terms. The Sentencing Commission 
officially asserts that the federal Guidelines were meant to control local 
variations in sentencing practices, such that consistent practices were 
intended to be enforced nationwide when prosecuting federal crimes.89 A few 
commentators agree that any regional disparities for local concerns are 
necessarily extralegal in nature and thus indefensible and that, because they 
are extralegal, their sheer existence nullifies a major purpose of the 
Guidelines.90  
Before reviewing potential sources of regional differences in federal 
sentencing outcomes, two limitations in the study’s design should be noted 
here. Federal district courts are comprised of more than one district judge.91 
As each sentencing decision is the product of a single judge, a preferable 
method would be to study interjudge outcomes. However, the Sentencing 
Commission deletes judge identifiers from its datasets such that it was not 
possible to distinguish between individual judges within districts. 
Nonetheless, as judges within the same district may share more correlated 
characteristics than with judges from other district courts and as districts are 
regionally oriented, investigating district level disparities remains important. 
The datasets likewise do not include identifiers for probation officers or the 
recommended sentences listed in their authored presentencing reports. 
There exist several potential sources of local variations in federal 
sentencing outcomes. One is that even though federal criminal law provides 
a single body of statutes covering the country equally,92 federal district courts 
still are situated in fixed, single locales. Districts, thus, represent regions. 
Federal law may have nationwide coverage but the commission of federal 
crimes are not equally spread out across the country. Nor will victims of 
                                                 
89 FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 90. 
90 Paula M. Kautt, Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation 
in Sentencing Outcomes for Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633, 635 (2002); 
Hofer at al., Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 12, at 243. 
91 See generally U.S. COURTS, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS 
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2015), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/authorized-judgeships. 
92 This reference excludes criminal laws solely focused on the District of Columbia, 
native American lands, and federal property. 
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federal crimes in different areas necessarily experience their losses the same. 
A particular region might become a hotspot for gun violence related to drug 
trafficking while the citizens of another feel more acutely the negative impact 
of financial fraud. There may be some value in allowing judges to equitably 
adapt national policy to more localized concerns such as these, albeit in 
moderation.93 Local variations may be proper, for instance, to swiftly and 
harshly respond to the area’s particular crime problem, such as a district court 
increasing the severity of punishment for weapons offenses as a deterrent 
device to try to counter a rise in local gun violence. Such a strategy would 
obviously differentiate that court’s sentencing statistics for firearm offenses. 
Another possibility for regional variations is if there is local hostility to a 
national policy concerning a particular crime or the Commission’s 
assessment of the severity of a crime. Observers may debate the propriety of 
a district judge’s ability to void a centralized policy. Such a rationale may be 
viewed reasonably in culturally sensitive terms to accommodate local 
priorities or, instead, as an inappropriate usurpation of the lawful powers of 
federal policymakers to make national policy decisions.94  
Other regional variations amongst federal courts in sentencing may be 
more or less benign, simply reflecting localized socialization in what are 
called courtroom workgroups. A cultural consensus unique to a courtroom 
workgroup may mean consistency in sentencing within that workgroup, but 
whose outcomes are uncorrelated (i.e., disparate) with outcomes generated 
by other courtrooms. This idea will be discussed further in the next Section 
that addresses two main theoretical foundations for between-court differences 
in criminal justice outcomes: the focal concerns perspective and the 
consequences of culturalized practices through the development of courtroom 
communities. For now, it is simply noted that the Sentencing Commission 
avers that regional variation in sentencing outcomes due to differing political 
climates or court cultures constitutes unwarranted disparity.95  
C.  Theoretical Foundations of Sentencing Decisions 
The focal concerns perspective is now a popular theoretical framework 
for understanding sentencing outcomes.96 The theory posits that decisions 
about penalties center on the authority’s situational assessment concerning 
three focal concerns: (1) the defendant’s culpability, (2) the defendant’s 
future dangerousness, and (3) the practical consequences of the decision to 
the defendant and the community.97  
                                                 
93 Bibas, supra note 60, at 138. 
94 Id. at 140. 
95 FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 80. 
96 Kutateladze et al., supra note 84, at 518. 
97 Jeffery T. Ulmer, James Eisenstein, & Brian D. Johnson, Trial Penalties in Federal 
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The Guidelines certainly address the focal concerns in their formalized 
rules regarding assessments of blameworthiness (e.g., offense level 
representing severity, offense type), future dangerousness (e.g., criminal 
history, acceptance of responsibility), and consequences of the penalty (e.g., 
substantial assistance reductions to conserve prosecutorial resources, fast-
track departures to permit more efficient case processing). Yet, considering 
human nature cannot always be entirely automated and the potential for 
highly-educated and experienced federal judges to believe in their own 
qualities of judgment, the Guidelines likely do not entirely constrain 
discretion in considering the focal concerns.  
Upward departures may rely more heavily on discretionary thought in that 
judges issuing them may be considering ideals or values not explicitly 
contained in the Guidelines rules. In addition, departure decisions beyond 
those expressed in the Guidelines presumably represent gaps in their set of 
rules. Thus, it is expected from the focal concerns perspective that there will 
be disparities in upward departure outcomes because of differences in judges’ 
situational assessment of the focal concerns in individual cases, the extent of 
their agreement with the Guidelines-driven proportionality judgment, and 
their relative concern about the practical consequences of the sentence. 
The second theoretical perspective popular in sentencing research regards 
community courtroom cultures. “Court communities are distinct, localized 
social worlds with their own relationship networks, organizational culture, 
political arrangements, and the like. These localized social worlds, with their 
organizational cultures and political realities, shape formal and informal case 
processing and sentencing norms.”98 Prior research consistently indicates that 
the type of sentence issued (e.g., probation versus imprisonment), the length 
of supervision, and the reasons for the particular penalty depend in part on 
the jurisdiction in which the defendant is sentenced because of localized 
differences in cultural, political, and social contexts.99 Contextual variations 
in these court communities may result from the “participants’ shared 
workplace and interdependent working relations between key sponsoring 
agencies (prosecutor’s office, bench, defense bar).”100 The courtroom 
community workgroup likely shares common experiences, and works 
together to develop normative practices to reduce uncertainty and serve a 
                                                 
Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 565-66 
(2010). 
98 Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variations in Trial Penalties among Serious 
Violent Offenses, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 641 (2006). 
99 Robert R. Weidner et al., The Impact of Contextual Factors on the Decision to 
Imprison in Large Urban Jurisdictions: A Multilevel Analysis, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 400, 
418 (2005). 
100 Ulmer &. Bradley, supra note 98, at 641. 
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communal goal of efficient case processing.101  
Empirical researchers tend to assume there exists little interdistrict 
variation in the federal system, specifically, because of the uniform set of 
laws and policies provided by federal statutes and the sentencing 
Guidelines.102 As a result, interdistrict variations in penalties at the federal 
level are understudied simply because of the presumption of little variance.103 
This assumption is likely invalid as other observers contend that federal 
courts do not necessarily act with uniformity.  
We view the federal district court system not as a singular national 
legal structure with hierarchically arranged and geographically 
dispersed subunits, but rather as a semi-autonomous set of systems 
governed by the same formal rules, states, and procedural policies, 
while also embedded in localized legal cultures that are themselves 
shaped by regionally specific historical contingencies and norms.104  
Even though federal district courts operate at the national level, the 
practitioners within them are often plucked from their own locales. 
Idiosyncratic local practices within district court communities can impact 
federal sentencing as judges and prosecutors are often chosen from within the 
state in which the district court resides; plus, defense counsel and probation 
staff tend to have previously resided in or near the districts in which they 
become employed.105 The Sentencing Commission does not discount the 
possibility of localized cultures. The agency has called for more lively 
research on geographic variations in sentencing practices and outcomes.106 
This Article responds to this call, too. The study herein was informed, as well, 
by previous empirical studies as to the most likely factors to consider in 
explaining federal sentencing outcomes. 
D.  Literature Review of Federal Sentencing Practices 
Criminologists have aptly recognized that “offenders are sanctioned 
partially for what they have done (offense characteristics, criminal history), 
for who they are (race/ethnicity, age, gender) and also for what they may fail 
                                                 
101 Brian D. Johnson & Stephanie M. Dipietro, The Power of Diversion: Intermediate 
Sanctions and Sentencing Disparity Under Presumptive Guidelines, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 811, 
819 (2012); Patricia D. Breen, The Trial Penalty and Jury Sentencing: A Study of Air Force 
Courts-Martial, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 206, 213 (2011). 
102 Wu & Spohn, supra note 52, at 291-92. 
103 Johnson et al., Social Context, supra note 52, at 740. 
104 Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of 
Booker: The Impact of Time and Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 411, 412 (2014). 
105 Michael Tonry, Federal Sentencing “Reform” Since 1984: The Awful as Enemy of 
the Good, 44 CRIME & JUST. 99, 124 (2015). 
106 FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 112. 
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to do during the punishment process (plead guilty or express remorse).”107 
Researchers commonly refer to these considerations as representing legal 
factors, extralegal factors, and case-processing factors. They are consistent 
with the focal concerns perspective regarding culpability, risk, and external 
consequences to the punishment. Prior research on federal sentencing 
outcomes has tended to corroborate these sentiments. The United States 
Sentencing Commission undertakes a laudable effort to make available its 
rich datasets to researchers. This sub-section will summarize results from 
prior empirical studies on federal penalties which have utilized Commission 
datasets. The results provided necessary information on which variables this 
study tested as likely to be significant predictors of sentencing outcomes. 
1. Significant Predictors of Sentencing Outcomes 
As for legal factors, prior research has confirmed that primary predictors 
of federal sentencing outcomes are offense seriousness, criminal history,108 
and crime type.109 As might be expected, multiple counts of conviction110 and 
the application of a mandatory minimum sentence are associated with longer 
federal sentences.111 In addition, official credit in the form of a reduction in 
offense levels for the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility reduces 
sentence length in statistical models.112   
Much research has found that demographic characteristics, which are 
                                                 
107 Ronald S. Everett & Roger A. Wotkiewicz, Difference, Disparity, and Race/Ethnic 
Bias in Federal Sentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 189, 208 (2002). 
108 E.g., Oleson et al., supra note 11, at 323 tbl. 2; Rob Tillyer et al., Differential 
Treatment of Female Defendants: Does Criminal History Moderate the Effect of Gender on 
Sentence Length in Federal Narcotics Cases, 42 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 703, 705 (2015) 
[hereinafter Tillyer et al., Gender] (citing studies); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties in 
Federal Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 576 
tbl. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties]. 
109 E.g., Franklin, Educational Attainment, supra note 38, at 151 tbl. 2; Kim et al., supra 
note 43, at tbl. 2; Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, supra note 52, at 761 tbl. 5. 
110 E.g., Jill K. Doerner & Stephen Demuth, Gender and Sentencing in the Federal 
Courts: Are Women Treated More Leniently, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 242, 255 tbl. 2 
(2014); Kautt, supra note 90, at 655 tbl. 4 (studying drug offenses). 
111 E.g., Kim et al., supra note 43, at 1084 tbl. 2; Lynch & Omori, supra note 104, at 
432 (studying drug trafficking cases); Kautt, supra note 90, at 655 tbl. 4 (studying drug 
offenses). See also Melissa Hamilton, Some Facts About Life: The Law, Theory, and Practice 
of Life Sentences, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 803, 848 tbl. 4 (2016) [hereinafter Hamilton, 
Life Sentences] (finding application of mandatory minimum predicted a sentence of 470 
months or more). 
112 Feldmeyer & Ulmer, supra note 39, at 252 tbl. 3 (finding any acceptance of 
responsibility credit reduced sentence length 15%); Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties, supra note 
108, at 576 tbl. 2 (finding each point reduction given for acceptance of responsibility reduced 
the sentence length 1% in model 2); Ulmer, Localized Uses, supra note 63, at 271 (finding 
acceptance of responsibility on average reduces sentences by a year in three of the districts 
studied). 
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generally considered to be extralegal factors for punishment purposes, are 
still correlated with sentence length. As for race and ethnicity, multiple 
studies of federal sentencing show that whites receive sentences of shorter 
length than blacks113 and Hispanics even when controlling for various 
factors.114 Several other projects find that the differences demonstrate 
unassailable racial disparities in federal sentencing.115 A commonly applied 
theoretical explanation for assigning more severe penalties to racial and 
ethnic minorities relates to the minority threat thesis in which stereotypes of 
minorities being more likely to recidivate may enter into the focal concern of 
future dangerousness.116 
Studies of sentencing rather consistently indicate that males are sentenced 
to longer periods of incarceration.117 An explanation for the gender effect 
regards the chivalry thesis in which paternalistic ideologies conceive of 
women in ways that reduce their blameworthiness, such as perceiving 
females as more childlike, less responsible for their own behavior, in need of 
male protection, and whose suffering should be kept to a minimum.118 In 
addition, it might be relevant to judges that women consistently show at lower 
                                                 
113 E.g., Oleson et al., supra note 11, at 323 tbl. 2; Doerner & Demuth, supra note 110, 
at 255 tbl. 2; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, supra note 39, at 252 tbl. 3; Amy Farrell et al., 
Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the 
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114 Kim et al., supra note 43, at 1084 tbl. 2. See also Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, supra 
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Hamilton, Life Sentences, supra note 111, at 848 tbl. 4 (finding no statistically significant 
racial/ethnic differences in long sentences (operationalized as at least 470 months) in federal 
sentencing in a model with multiple controls). 
116 Cyndy Caravelis et al., Static and Dynamic Indicators of Minority Threat in 
Sentencing Outcomes: A Multi-Level Analysis, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 405, 407 
(2011). 
117 E.g., Tillyer et al., Gender, supra note 108, at 713 tbl. 2 (citing studies and reporting 
on study of drug offenses); RHODES ET AL., supra note 37, at 67; David B. Mustard, Racial, 
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J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001). 
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risk of recidivism.119 
In some studies, noncitizens are at a statistically significant greater 
likelihood of incarceration120 and an increase in sentence length compared to 
citizens.121 A theory for why noncitizenship might lead to more punitive 
outcomes is that persons presenting with an attribute that makes them 
culturally dissimilar to the American-born population might be adjudged 
more negatively as outsiders and thereby subject to marginalization in a 
socially stratified society.122 Still, an opposing theory argues persons not 
legally resident in the United States are deportable and thus a longer sentence 
may be unnecessary.123 
Studies commonly indicate that older offenders are treated more leniently 
than their younger counterparts.124 It could be the negative correlation 
between older age and severity of penalty is not just about age per se, but a 
combination of age, infirmity, and physical impairment may lead to an 
empathetic response.125 The impact of age may also be for the focal concern 
of future dangerousness as older offenders are less likely to recidivate.126  
Two case-processing factors are relevant to predicting sentencing 
decisions. The so-called trial penalty occurs when being found guilty at trial 
(rather than plead) is correlated with more serious punishments.127 The trial 
                                                 
119 See generally Tonya L. Nicholls et al., Female Offenders, in APA HANDBOOK OF 
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 79 (Brian L. Cutler & Patricia A. Zapf eds., 2nd ed., 2015) 
(reviewing studies and rationales for females being less risky). 
120 Michael T. Light, The New Face of Legal Inequality: Noncitizens and the Long-Term 
Trends in Sentencing Disparities Across U.S. District Courts, 1992-2009, 48 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 447, 464 tbl. 2 (2014) [hereinafter Light, Noncitizens]; Johnson & Betsinger, supra 
note 38, at 1067 tbl. 3. 
121 E.g., Kim et al., supra note 43, at 1084 tbl. 2; Light, Noncitizens, supra note 120, at 
466; Mustard, supra note 117, at 301. Though, at least one other study are to the contrary, 
showing that lacking citizenship has a suppressing impact on the length of the term of 
imprisonment. Oleson et al., supra note 11, at 323 tbl. 2, 325 tbl. 3 (though the statistic was 
not statistically significant). 
122 Light, Noncitizens, supra note 120, at 455. 
123 Scott E. Wolfe et al., Unraveling the Effect of Offender Citizenship Status on Federal 
Sentencing Outcomes, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 349, 352 (2011). 
124 E.g., Anita N. Blowers & Jill K. Doerner, Sentencing Outcomes of the Older Prison 
Population: An Exploration of the Age Leniency Argument, 38 J. CRIME & JUST. 1, 3-4 (2013) 
(citing studies); Johnson et al., Social Context, supra note 52, at 761 tbl. 5 (finding older age 
positively correlated with downward departure decisions); John D. Burrow & Barbara A. 
Koons-Witt, Elderly Status, Extraordinary Physical Impairments and Intercircuit Variation 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 11 ELDER L.J. 273, 312-13 tbl.3, 4 (2004) (finding 
that in a few districts defendants age 50 and over were more likely to receive downward 
departures). 
125 Burrow & Koons-Witt, supra note 124, at 296. 
126 Franklin, Educational Attainment, supra note 38, at 142.  
127 E.g., Kim et al., supra note 43, at 1084 tbl. 2; Andrew Chongseh Kim, 
Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and 
Draft]             7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) 23 
penalty may be about punishing those who have the “temerity to go to 
trial.”128 It could be viewed instead in terms of rewarding pleas, such as 
rewarding cooperation and remorse while also preserving court resources.129 
As for the second case-processing factor, studies at the state and federal 
levels rather consistently show that pretrial detention is significantly and 
positively related to incarceration and sentence length.130 Pretrial detention 
effects are likely due to the same drivers as the focal concerns perspective 
posit. Those who are denied release pretrial may be more likely to have 
committed a more serious crime, bear a significant criminal history, and 
present with other indicators that elevate their potential recidivism risk.131  
Studies which include district or circuit variables in their models have 
generally found geographic disparity in federal sentences.132 These outcomes 
lend support to the court communities’ perspective of localized practices 
influencing case decisions and fostering regional differences in federal 
sentencing.  
2. The Outcome of Interest in Prior Studies 
A significant majority of the foregoing studies on federal sentencing use 
the incarceration decision (in/out) and/or sentence length as their outcome of 
interest. Some researchers affirmatively, though, recognize the importance of 
investigating departure decisions. Almost all of the studies of federal 
departure decisions to date which model the dependent variable on departure 
outcomes address downward departures.133 Decisions to depart downward 
                                                 
Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1220 (2015); Breen, supra note 101, at 
211 (citing studies). 
128 Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 
409 (2008). 
129 Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties, supra note 108, at 564. 
130 E.g., Oleson et al., supra note 11, at 316-17 (citing studies); Franklin, Educational 
Attainment, supra note 38, at 151 tbl. 2; Wolfe et al., supra note 123, at 355 tbl. 2. There is 
one study to the contrary where being out on bail increased sentence length, which the 
authors did not expect and do not explain the result. Farrell et al., supra note 113, at 115 tbl. 
3. 
131 Oleson et al., supra note 11, at 317. Correspondingly, a judge may perceive a 
defendant who is released on bail and complies with supervision as presenting with a positive 
rehabilitation potential. Id. 
132 E.g., Wu & Spohn, supra note 52, at 306 (finding differences in the likelihood of 
downward departures across three Midwestern districts); Ulmer, Localized Uses, supra note 
63, at 269 (finding from a study of four districts significant variations in the likelihood of 
granting substantial assistance downward departures).  
133 E.g., Tillyer & Hartley, supra note 7, at 635 tbl. 2; Kimberly A. Kaiser & Cassia 
Spohn, Fundamentally Flawed? Exploring the Use of Policy Disagreements in Judicial 
Downward Departures for Child Pornography Sentences, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
241 (2014); Melissa A. Logue, Downward Departures in US Federal Courts: Do Family 
Ties, Sex, and Race/Ethnicity Matter?, 34 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 683 (2011); Johnson et 
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are certainly deserving of study because a significant percentage of federal 
sentences these days are below their Guidelines minimums.134 None of the 
previous empirical studies appear to have focused extensively on the effect 
of upward departures as the outcome of interest. This is curiously true, despite 
upward departures arguably being more substantial, such as leading to longer 
sentences in the face of the federal prison overpopulation. Plus, their relative 
rarity renders upward departures more symbolic in nature, perhaps perceived 
therefore as arbitrary. Almost all the studies to date which consider the 
upward departure decision as a variable at all simply add it as a control 
without further discussion of its significance because their interests 
concerned other aspects of sentencing.135  
It appears that only three studies (two of them by the same author) have 
so far utilized the upward departure decision as an outcome variable. 
Nevertheless, in these trio of studies the upward departure decision was one 
of multiple outcomes in single-level regressions and the authors did not spend 
too much space delving into the upward departure’s importance in federal 
sentencing outcomes.136 The earliest study utilized pre-Booker data and 
controlled only for sociodemographic characteristics.137 The researcher’s 
attention in the other two studies concerned Booker-based variations in 
sentencing outcomes more generally and the potential, more specifically, for 
courtroom disparities before and after Booker (finding greater disparity in 
upward departures post-Booker)138 and racial disparities (finding greater 
racial disparities in upward departure decisions post-Booker).139 This latter 
author in one study tested a subset of the Commission’s data for the time 
period of study140 and reports little in either paper of the effects of explanatory 
factors tested with respect to upward departures (other than race and the 
Booker time trend) and for some reason excluded many predictor variables 
found to be relevant to sentencing outcomes.141 
                                                 
al., Social Context, supra note 52. 
134 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK tbl. N (2016). 
135 E.g., Franklin et al., Intermediate Sanctions, supra note 5; Tillyer et al., Gender, 
supra note 108, at 713 tbl. 2; Ulmer & Light, supra note 39, at 336 tbl. 2; Feldmeyer & 
Ulmer, supra note 39, at 252 tbl. 3. 
136 Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal 
Sentencing, 44 J. LEG. STUD. 75, 95-98 (2015) [hereinafter Yang, Discretion]; Crystal S. 
Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? 
Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1314 (2014) [hereinafter Yang, Interjudge]; 
Mustard, supra note 117, at 305-09. 
137 Mustard, supra note 117, at 310 tbl. 11. 
138 Yang, Interjudge, supra note 132, at 1315. 
139 Yang, Discretion, supra note 136, at 98.  
140 Yang, Interjudge, supra note 132, at 1296. 
141 Yang, Discretion, supra note 136, at 98 (indicating in model for upward departures 
included only predictor variables regarding race, time frame based on United States Supreme 
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Due to the paucity of research with a concentration on the upward 
departure decision, the importance of it in the results of sentencing outcomes 
in terms of severity of sentence, and the symbolic nature of the discretionary 
decision with respect to potentially reflecting gaps in the Guidelines, the 
opportunity to fill the void was compelling. Then the recent availability of 
more aggressive computing resources to permit employing a sophisticated 
research design known as multilevel modeling would allow this study to also 
be able to test for possible regional disparities. Hence, the next Section offers 
such a study. 
IV.  A MULTILEVEL STUDY OF UPWARD DEPARTURES 
The most common type of advanced statistical analysis of sentencing 
outcomes is a single-level regression model with individual predictors.142 At 
its simplest, a regression can test the relationship between an independent 
(also known as predictor or explanatory) variable and the dependent (also 
referred to as outcome or response) variable of interest.143 It is unlikely, 
though, for any outcome of interest in the complex world of criminal justice 
to be fully explained by one independent factor.144 Certainly, the focal 
concerns and courtroom workgroup perspectives would predict that 
numerous factors would play a role in individual criminal justice outcomes. 
Helpfully, sophisticated regression models permit a researcher to test the 
effects of a host of independent variables on the chosen dependent variable, 
and most current regression studies appropriately utilize multiple predictors. 
A value of a multiple regression analysis is that a researcher can investigate 
the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable while 
controlling for (i.e., holding constant) the effect of other explanatory 
                                                 
Court rulings such as Booker, offense type, offense level, criminal history, district, year, and 
month); Yang, Interjudge, supra note 132, at 1314-15 (controls included time variables, 
offense type, offense level, criminal history, and districts). In the 2015 report, the author’s 
conclusion with a logistic regression analysis was that for fiscal years 1994-2010 blacks were 
more likely (with statistical significance) to be assigned upward departures than whites. I 
was generally able to replicate this result using the Commission’s full dataset for most of the 
time period of study (fiscal 1999-2010) following the paper’s indication of methodology and 
control variables except for the Booker timing and sentence month. However, by re-
specifying the model with additional, statistically significant controls, the coefficient for 
blacks (compared to whites) became nonsignificant. This means that the difference indicated 
for racial disparity in the other researcher’s model appears to be explained away by the 
addition of other legal and extra-legal factors (specifically, the variables I added were 
acceptance of responsibility, custody status, number of counts, gender, citizenship, and age).  
142 Cassia Spohn, The Evolution of Sentencing Research, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 2 (2015). 
143 RONET BACHMAN & RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 489 (1997). 
144 Id. 
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variables.145 For example, if the researcher is interested in whether race is 
associated with sentence length, she likely ought to include offense severity 
and criminal history (at the very least) in the model to control for them as it 
could be that the association between race and sentence length may be largely 
explained by such legal factors. 
Sentencing research now seems on the precipice to replacing single-level 
regressions with the more sophisticated technique of multilevel modeling. 
A.  Multilevel Modeling 
The concept of multilevel modeling is a relatively recent development in 
the field of statistics.146 The growth of interest in conducting multilevel 
modeling in the last decade is likely based on several factors. Some 
researchers have realized the flaws in single-level designs when the units of 
analysis are nested within groups where group-level factors affect the 
outcome of interest.147 As a result of this early research, knowledge about 
multilevel models is starting to become more readily available in scientific 
literature.148 In addition, technological improvements in statistical software 
and hardware computing ability make the resource-intensive analysis of 
multilevel data more accessible and workable.149  
In discussing multilevel models, the terminology typically entails levels, 
typically in a linear fashion to signify the nesting structure. Level-1 is the 
most elemental. Level-1 units are clustered at Level-2. Three-level models 
involve Level-2 clusters that are nested into a higher order. For instance, as 
visually represented in Figure 1, federal sentencing entails a hierarchical 
structure in which individual defendants represent Level-1 units, with district 
courts at Level-2, and circuit courts representing Level-3.  
                                                 
145 Paul Hofer, The Commission Defends an Ailing Hypothesis: Does Judicial Discretion 
Increase Demographic Disparity?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 311, 311 (2013). 
146 ANTHONY S. BRYK & STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS: 
APPLICATION AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 3-4 (1992). 
147 Brian D. Johnson & Christina D. Stewart, Measurement Issues in Criminal Case 
Processing and Court Decision-Making Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT 
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 303, 314-15 (Beth M. Huebner & Timothy 
S. Bynum eds., 2016) (citing multilevel modeling research sources in criminal justice). 
148 E.g., see generally JOOP J. HOX, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES AND 
APPLICATIONS (2nd ed., 2010); Leonardo Grilli & Carla Rampichini, Specification of 
Random Effects in Multilevel Models: A Review, 49 QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE 967 
(2015). 
149 Daniel A. Powers, Multilevel Models for Binary Data, 154 NEW DIRECTIONS INST. 
RES. 57, 62 (2012). 
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Figure 1. Example of a Three-Level Model for Federal Sentencing 
 
 
Multilevel methods permit the researcher to specify an explanatory 
variable as a fixed effect, a random effect, or both. A fixed effect variable 
specifies a single value in the model and is applicable to each Level-1 unit, 
regardless of which Level-2 group the unit is situated.150 The coefficient of a 
fixed effect variable acts like an explanatory variable in a single-level 
regression analysis, indicating the variable’s effect on the outcome of interest. 
In the study herein, individual defendants comprise Level-1, such that the 
fixed effects test for how the unique attributes of the individual defendant 
impacts whether an upward departure is issued. As an example, the study 
tests whether the defendant’s gender is correlated with an upward departure. 
A random effect, on the other hand, allows an explanatory variable to 
vary between Level-2 units such that each Level-2 group has its own estimate 
of that variable.151 It should be noted that a random effect does not signify 
that it is unsystematic, occurs by chance, or is unexplained. Instead, a variable 
being specified as random refers to observing whether its effect on the 
dependent variable fluctuates over Level-2 groupings.152 For our purposes in 
this paper, a random effect tests whether, for example, even if gender is found 
overall to be a significant individual predictor of an upward departure, the 
same effect is consistently observed (or not) across district courts.  
                                                 
150 Andrew F. Hayes, Multilevel Modeling, 32 HUMAN COMM. RES. 385, 389 (2006). 
151 Id. 
152 Tom A.B. Snijders, Fixed and Random Effects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS IN 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 664, 664 (Brian S. Everitt & David C. Howell eds., 2005). 
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A random effect coefficient for a predictor variable that is statistically 
significant, for purposes of the study herein, indicates that (a) the magnitude 
(i.e., strength) of the effect of the variable is weaker in some districts but 
stronger in other districts, and possibly (b) that the effect of that variable 
changes direction across districts units from positive to negative, or vice 
versa.153 As an hypothesized example of (b), it could be that criminal history 
is a positive predictor in some districts, meaning that the higher criminal 
history score increases the likelihood of an upward departure; yet, criminal 
history could be a negative predictor in other districts, such that a higher 
criminal history score decreases the chance of an upward departure. A 
random effect that is not statistically significant may still provide meaningful 
information. A non-statistically significant random effect indicates that the 
effect of that predictor variable on the outcome fails to differ across districts 
such that the effect is not group-dependent (here, this means the relationship 
between the predictor and an upward depart is relatively consistent across 
districts). 
A multilevel study that includes both fixed and random effects is 
generally referred to as a mixed model. One of the strengths of specifying 
multilevel modeling is the ability to test whether a particular explanatory 
variable may have different effects at each level. An explanatory variable 
may be statistically significant at Level-1 (the fixed effect) and may—or may 
not—show statistical significance at Level-2 (the random effect), or vice 
versa.154 
Overall, multilevel modeling presents an advancement for statistical 
research in criminal justice. In regards to penalty outcomes, it is particularly 
important to focus on both (a) individual level predictors because of the focal 
concerns perspective, and (b) on jurisdictional level variations because there 
may be relevant contextual differences stemming from unique cultural 
characteristics or peculiarities produced through discrete courtroom 
community practices.155 Further information on the theoretical, statistical, 
and practical values of multi-level modeling can be found in the Appendix to 
this paper. 
Despite the many advantages of multilevel modeling techniques, 
relatively few multilevel studies have been conducted in federal sentencing. 
This does not mean that many other researchers have not been cognizant of 
                                                 
153 John Wooldredge, Judges’ Unequal Contributions to Extralegal Disparities in 
Imprisonment, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 539, 549 (2010). 
154 Multilevel modeling can thereby overcome aggregation bias that exists when an 
explanatory variable shows different results at different levels. BRYK & RAUDENBUSH, supra 
note 146, at 83.  
155 Gaylene S. Armstrong & Nancy Rodriguez, Effects of Individual and Contextual 
Characteristics on Preadjudication Detention of Juvenile Delinquents, 22 JUST. Q. 521, 525 
(2005). 
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the potential that geographical and jurisdictional differences may have 
significant impacts on individual sentencing outcomes. Typically, 
researchers realizing the potential for regional differences in federal 
sentencing simply control for these group-level variances in single-level 
regression models by adding districts156 or circuit courts157 as a series of 
dummy variables. It was certainly proper to account for at least some of the 
variation that district and circuit courts may introduce to sentencing 
outcomes. Yet these single-level regression models were unable then to take 
advantage of the benefits of multilevel modeling, and it is possible that at 
least some of the results in those studies were therefore biased. 
The rather scant number of studies which do apply a better specified 
model from a methodological perspective by adapting multilevel modeling to 
federal sentencing data have tended to focus on sentence length as the 
outcome of interest.158 Several researchers have studied departure decisions 
in multilevel designs, though they concentrate on downward departures as 
the dependent variable.159 In any event, these studies typically utilized pre-
Booker data160 and, therefore, may no longer be generalizable to the current 
state of affairs. This study supplements the existing literature by addressing 
upward departures, drawing upon a lengthy period of post-Booker sentencing 
practices, and providing a mixed model with a host of fixed and random effect 
explanatory variables. The data and methods are next summarized. 
B.  Data and Methods 
This study used Commission datasets for the fiscal years 2008-2015 to 
represent a long period of sentencing practices and to account for post-Booker 
discretionary decisionmaking. These datasets offer a host of variables parsing 
individual sentence details. The Commission codes the variables based on a 
variety of documents: the judgment and commitment order, the Statement of 
Reasons, any plea agreement, the indictment, and the presentence 
                                                 
156 E.g., Franklin et al., Intermediate Sanctions, supra note 5; Joshua B. Fischman & 
Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 
740 (2012); Ulmer & Light, supra note 39, at 334; Johnson & Betsinger, supra note 38, at 
1068 tbl. 3; Mustard, supra note 117, at 300. 
157 E.g., Blowers & Doerner, supra note 124, at 8; Doerner & Demuth, supra note 110, 
at 254; Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Policy Adjudication and Empiricism, 30 GA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 375, 454 tbl. 3 (2014). 
158 Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties, supra note 108, at 575; Lynch & Omori, supra note 
104, at 423.  
159 Tillyer & Hartley, supra note 7, at 1631; Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, supra note 52, 
at 750. 
160 E.g., Feldmeyer & Ulmer, supra note 39; Albonetti & Baller, supra note 39; Farrell 
et al., supra note 113, at 103; Kautt, supra note 90, at 648. 
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investigation report.161  
There are three main research questions:  
1. Is there significant variation across district courts in the use of upward 
departures?  
2. To what extent do legal, extralegal, and case-processing factors 
account for upward departures in individual cases?  
3. Do district courts vary from each other in the extent to which they 
weigh each of the legal extralegal, and case-processing factors when issuing 
upward departures?  
In the multilevel design, the outcome (dependent) variable is whether the 
judge issued a sentence that was an upward departure from the Guidelines 
recommendation. This outcome and a list of the multiple predictor variables 
(comprising legal, extralegal, and case-processing factors) which survived to 
the final multilevel model and their coding are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Coding Scheme of Variables 
 
Variables 
Coding 
Scheme 
 
Description 
   
Dependent Variable  
Upward Departure 
 
1 = yes Defendant received an upward 
departure 
Predictor Variables 
Legal   
Final Offense Level Scale Guidelines scale rating offense severity 
from 1-43 
Criminal History Ordinal Guidelines ranking of criminal history 
from I-VI 
Number of Counts Log (scale) Natural log of the number of counts of 
conviction162 
General Offense 
Type 
Five dummy 
variables 
Five dummy indicators with the 
reference category of drug offenses 
Acceptance of 
Responsibility 
1 = yes Dummy indicator for having received a 
reduction in offense levels for accepting 
responsibility 
Extralegal    
Male 1 = male Dummy indicator for gender 
Minority 1 = minority Dummy indicator for black, Hispanic, 
or other together coded as 1, with the 
reference category white163 
U.S. Citizen 1 = citizen Dummy indicator for a U.S. citizen 
                                                 
161 CHRISTINE KITCHENS, FEDERAL SENTENCING DATA AND ANALYSIS ISSUES 1 (2010). 
162 See the Appendix for an explanation of the natural log. 
163 See the Appendix for an explanation underlying thee coding of the race variable. 
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Variables 
Coding 
Scheme 
 
Description 
Age Over 50 1 = yes Dummy indicator for age 50 and above 
Case-Processing    
In Custody 1 = yes Dummy indicator for being in custody 
at time of sentencing 
Trial 1 = yes Dummy indicator for going to trial 
(versus a plea) 
Level-2 Nominal 94 districts 
 
In addition to the multilevel models, a statistical analysis was conducted 
concerning just the upward departure cases. Commission rules direct district 
judges when departing from the Guidelines to state the reasons for the 
departure and to specifically record them in the Commission-generated 
Statement of Reasons form that is submitted with the paperwork for each 
individual sentencing.164 These are then coded by staff into the Commission’s 
datasets. Thus, a separate analysis (external to the multi-level model) ran 
frequency distributions of the multiple variables representing the reasons 
judges provided for the upward departure cases over fiscal years 2008-2015. 
The results of the multilevel studies and these frequency distributions are 
provided next. 
C.  Results 
The research questions posed earlier indicated a two-level design with 
district courts at Level-2. Descriptive statistics regarding the variables that 
survived to the resulting full model are provided in Table 2. 
                                                 
164 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K2.0(3). 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
               Variable  Mean (%) 
Dependent Variable 
    Upward Departure 
 
Predictor Variables 
Legal  
 
         (2.0%)   
    Final Offense Level        18.72 
    Criminal History          2.48 
    Number of Counts   1.42 
    General Offense Type 
         Drugs 
         Violent 
         Firearms 
         Immigration 
         Property 
         Other 
 
(33.0%) 
  (5.9%) 
(10.6%) 
(29.9%) 
(16.5%) 
(14.0%) 
    Acceptance of Responsibility (94.8%) 
Extralegal  
    Female (12.8%) 
    Minority        (73.5%) 
    U.S. Citizen (58.7%) 
    Age Over 50        (12.5%) 
Case-Processing   
    In Custody (75.3%) 
    Trial   (3.5%) 
 
Separate statistical analyses of Commission datasets (fiscal 2008-2015) 
indicated that an upward departure is typically of significant consequence to 
the receiving defendant’s sentence: the mean sentence for those defendants 
receiving an upward departure for the period of study was 84.44 months 
(about 7 years), with a range from probation to 4,253 months (about 354 
years).165 
The final multilevel model included 567,294 cases and is provided in 
                                                 
165 The reader may wonder if the 354 year figure is a typographical error or a data error. 
It is not. This extreme sentence was handed to Corey Deyon Duffey in 2010 for a series of 
bank robberies. Two of Duffey’s co-defendants received similar sentences of 355 and 330 
years. Perhaps not surprisingly, the district that sentenced them to these extreme sentences 
was the Northern District of Texas, the same district that has the highest rate of upward 
departures in the study period (2008-2015). For more information on the use of extreme 
sentences such as Duffey’s, see generally Hamilton, Extreme Sentences, supra note 50. 
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Table 3.166 All variables were estimated with both fixed and random effects 
except for one. The general offense type series of five dummy variables was 
excluded from random effects for statistical resource reasons, as explained in 
the Appendix. In Table 3, the left column lists the predictor variables. The 
middle column indicates their coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios 
for the fixed effects. The right hand column lists the coefficients and standard 
errors for the random effects. 
                                                 
166 Eleven percent of the potential cases were excluded because of missing data on any 
one of the final predictor factors. There is no reason to believe the missing cases represent 
any bias. 
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Table 3. Full Multilevel Model of Upward Departures 
Variable 
Fixed  
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
 b S.E. Odds 
Ratio 
  s2 S.E. 
Intercept 
 
-5.021 .152   -----*** .064 .051 
Legal Factors          
Final Offense Level   -.072 .004   .931*** .001*** .000 
Criminal History    .057 .013 1.059*** .009*** .002 
Number of Counts (log)    .315 .018 1.370*** .009** .003 
General Offense Type 
     Drugs (reference) 
     Violent 
     Firearms 
     Immigration 
     Property 
     Other 
 
 
 1.576 
   .694 
   .199 
   .532 
.503 
 
 
.116 
.094 
.106 
.096 
.116 
 
 
4.838*** 
2.001*** 
1.221 
1.702*** 
1.653*** 
--- --- 
Acc. of Responsibility  -.728 .070   .483*** .045* .018 
Extralegal Factors      
Female -.559 .047   .572*** .018 .014 
Minority    .045 .044 1.046 .035*** .010 
U.S. Citizen .509 .066 1.664*** .148*** .031 
Age Over 50 .311 .031 1.364*** .010 .006 
Case-Processing       
In Custody 1.403 .055 4.066*** .055*** .016 
Trial -.100 .084   .905 .063* .027 
Random intercept 
ρ 
-2LL = 4149605 
n = 567,294 
   .064             .051 
1.9% 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
 
The final model includes a substantial portion of the explanations for 
upward departures. Overall, the model poses a 98% correct classification rate. 
This section textually delineates the substantive results, with further 
discussion to follow in the next Section to explore how the theoretical 
background regarding focal concerns and the community workgroup thesis 
may help explain these results. 
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1. Individual Disparities 
The results for the fixed effects (i.e., individual defendant predictors) will 
be addressed first. All of the legal factors achieved statistical significance in 
their individual effects on upward departures. The final offense level was 
negatively associated with the odds of an upward departure: the odds of an 
upward departure decreased 7% for every one level increase in the final 
offense level. The criminal history score had the opposite effect in being 
positively associated with an upward departure: the odds of an upward 
departure increased 6% for each one unit increase in criminal history 
category. The presence of multiple counts of conviction were associated with 
increased odds of an upward departure. Regarding crime type, compared to 
drug offenders as the reference category, the other offense types were more 
likely to receive upward departures. Violent offenders faced almost five times 
the odds of an upward departure while the odds for firearm offenders 
doubled. Only immigration offenses did not result in statistical significance. 
Acceptance of responsibility lowered the odds of an upward departure by a 
factor of two.167 
Demographic variables were also modeled as fixed effects. Females were 
significantly less likely to receive upward departures than males, even after 
controlling for multiple factors: an upward departure for males was almost 
two times the odds as for females. U.S. citizens were more likely to be 
assigned upward departures, with the odds of citizens receiving upward 
departures being 66% greater as compared to noncitizens. There was also an 
age effect, with those age 50 and over being more likely to receive an upward 
departure compared to their younger counterparts.  
Minorities were at higher risk of upward departures. The odds of a 
minority defendant receiving an upward departure increased 5% when 
controlling for the other legal and nonlegal variables. However, the result at 
the individual case level (Level-1) for the minority variable was not 
statistically significant. Still, as will be addressed further below, the minority 
factor was retained as there was a statistically significant random effect 
(districts at Level-2) for it, indicating that the lack of significance at the 
individual case level does not mean there is not a minority effect on 
increasing the odds of an upward departure in at least some districts. 
Both case-processing factors were statistically significant. Custody status 
exhibited a large effect, increasing the odds of an upward departure by a 
factor of four for those in custody at sentencing. The trial penalty was not 
statistically significant at the individual level. However, the trial versus plea 
factor was retained because, as also addressed below, the random effect 
                                                 
167 As the coefficient is less than 1.00, we can interpret the effect on the odds by taking 
the reciprocal of the odds ratio = 1/.483. 
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coefficient for the trial penalty at the district level indicated statistical 
significance, signifying that there are trial penalties in at least some districts. 
2. District Disparities 
The random effects (i.e., variations among districts) of the variables in 
the far right columns of Table 3 indicate whether the effect of each predictor 
varied across districts (except offense type which was excluded for statistical 
reasons per the Appendix). All but two of the predictor factors with random 
effects (being gender and age over 50) were found to vary across districts to 
a statistically significant degree.  
Further information on the variability of each predictor factor that was 
modeled with fixed and random effects can be provided. Computations 
adding and subtracting one and two standard deviations indicated by each 
predictor variable’s random effect from the same variable’s fixed effect 
coefficient show whether the variability between districts concerns the 
strength of the correlation with the outcome and if the direction of the 
correction is positive in some districts yet negative in others.168 In other 
words, a particular variable may have a stronger effect on the upward 
departure decision in different districts compared to others. The same 
variable may also have inconsistent effects in that it is predictive of an upward 
departure in some districts yet is predictive of no upward departure in others. 
For six of the random effects, the size of the effect across two standard 
deviations varied between districts (i.e., across 95% of the districts), but not 
the direction. The number of counts of conviction, age over 50, and being in 
custody at sentencing were each positively correlated with upward departures 
in at least 95% of districts. The final offense level, acceptance of 
responsibility, and being female were negative predictors of upward 
departures in at least 95% of districts.   
In contrast, the effect of each of criminal history score, minority status, 
and trial penalty showed that the strength and the direction of its influence 
changed across just one standard deviation (i.e., two-thirds of districts). This 
means that not only the size of the effect of these three variables varied 
amongst districts but that each held a positive effect in at least some districts 
while indicating a negative impact in others. U.S. citizenship held a positive 
association with upward departures in one standard deviation, but across two 
standard deviations the effect was observed to be negative in at least a few 
districts. 
A supplemental data analysis provides further information about the 
reasons for upward departure decisions derived from the judges’ Statement 
of Reasons forms filed with sentencing paperwork in individual cases. Table 
4 contains the top ten cited reasons for upward departures capture through 
                                                 
168 See generally JOOP, supra note 148, at 19. 
Draft]             7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) 37 
frequency analyses of the Commission’s data, along with their prevalence. 
Table 4. Specific Reasons Given by Judges for Upward Departures 
 
Rank 
 
            Reason 
Percentage 
of Cases 
  1 Criminal history issues 60.0% 
  2 Nature and circumstances of the offense and history 
and character of the defendant 
53.5% 
  3 Reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 
respect for the law, and provide just punishment 
49.9% 
  4 Deterrence 42.6% 
  5 Protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant 
40.9% 
  6 Rehabilitation  9.3% 
  7 Avoid unwarranted disparities 8.0% 
  8 Dismissed and acquitted conduct 8.4% 
  9 General adequacy issue 5.5% 
10 General guideline issue 4.4% 
 
Importantly, considering the title of this Article, unwarranted disparities 
in upward departures as an external consequence was among the top ten 
rationales as observed in Table 4. Judges cited disparity issues in one out of 
twelve upward departure decisions. This result indicates that numerous 
judges remain cognizant of the potential downsides of the appearance of 
disparities in sentencing practices. It is also suggestive of gaps in the 
Guidelines to the extent these judges perceive that the Guidelines calculations 
in the instant cases failed to achieve proportionality with sentences for 
similarly-situated defendants. The other reasons judges gave as indicated in 
Table 4 as justifications for upward departures will be explored further in the 
context of the general discussion of the results that follows. 
D.  Discussion 
The results just provided can now be more fully addressed concerning the 
three research questions previously posed. Further, they can be better 
understood in the context of the theoretical perspectives offered implicating 
the focal concerns perspective and the courtroom workgroup thesis. 
1. Distract Disparities Overall 
The first research question queried whether there existed significant 
variation between district courts in the use of upward departures. The answer 
is in the affirmative. Bivariate results that were the result of additional 
statistical analyses indicated a differential of twelve times the rate of upward 
departures between the lowest rate district and the highest. Significant 
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variation was confirmed in a null multilevel model (see the Appendix) which 
indicated that 8% of the total variance in upward departure outcomes is 
explained at the district court level. This rate was statistically significant at 
the .001 level. In other words, this means that eight percent of the differences 
in upward departure decisions are accounted for by district court practices. 
This result of district differences was expected from the courtroom 
workgroup perspective in that cultures unique to certain districts may 
influence sentencing outcomes that contrast with outcomes from other 
cultures/districts. 
2. Individual Disparities 
The second general research question asked to what extent legal, 
extralegal, and case-processing factors accounted for upward departures in 
individual cases. Generally the results support the influence of the focal 
concerns (concerning the defendant’s culpability and future risk and the 
consequences of the sentence) on individual outcomes with respect to upward 
departures. 
The legal variables supported the focal concerns expectation that 
perceptions of the defendant’s blameworthiness are highly relevant to 
individual penalties. The results indicated an increased likelihood of an 
upward departure for a higher criminal history score, multiple counts of 
conviction, and violent and firearms offenses (compared to drug offenders). 
Criminal history and additional counts signify multiple crimes and perhaps 
perpetrated on multiple occasions, perhaps demonstrating greater culpability 
and harm. The increased odds for violent and firearms offenses reveal 
culpability concerns in that crimes posing a risk to human life likely are 
considered more egregious than many nonviolent offences.  
The decreased likelihood of an upward departure for acceptance of 
responsibility is also consistent with a concern for the defendant’s 
blameworthiness as well as with the focal concern of future risk. Accepting 
responsibility by admitting guilt at an early stage in the proceeding may be 
perceived to reduce one’s culpability while predicting positive rehabilitation 
potential. The negative correlation of acceptance of responsibility with 
upward departures was consistent across at least 95% of districts. 
Curiously, the final offense level was negatively correlated with the 
upward departure decision. This result seems to be somewhat contradictory 
to the focal concern with greater offender culpability predicting more severe 
sentences. It may instead, then, suggest that in these cases judges find the 
Guidelines calculations to be more than sufficiently proportional to 
reasonable sentences as adjudging offense severity. This explanation is likely 
because stakeholders tend to find Guidelines recommendations are overly 
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punitive as a general rule.169  
Further discussion of criminal history is warranted as it played a strong 
role throughout the results. There were multiple indications that judges 
perceive inadequacies in the criminal history calculations. As previously 
indicated, a higher Guidelines-calculated criminal history score increased the 
odds of an upward departure despite multiple controls. This result implies 
that judges in these cases do not believe the criminal history calculation is 
sufficiently proportional to prior offending evidence, at least when the 
defendant already has a substantial criminal history as officially calculated 
pursuant to Guidelines rules. This observation is buttressed by the reasons 
judges listed in explaining upward departures. In the list of rationales judges 
gave for upward departures from the frequency distributions provided in 
Table 4, the role of criminal background is salient. Criminal history 
calculation issues were expressly cited in 60% of the cases, earning the top 
ranked reason overall for upward departures. Relatedly, as a separately coded 
reason, evidence of dismissed and acquitted conduct was listed as an 
explanation for upwardly departing in 8% of upward departures. Further, past 
offending may be part of the second ranked reason, which includes the history 
and character of the defendant, cited in over half of the upward departures. 
Because of the broad nature of that particular reason as including the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, though, it is difficult to parse what portion 
of the fifty percent was for prior offending specifically. Still, the failure of 
the formal criminal history calculation to adequately account for prior 
offending was evident in a significant majority of upward departures.170 
Overall, the salience of criminal history is theoretically important for 
another reason. The function of the defendant’s criminal history in the various 
results implicates the focal concern regarding the defendant’s future risk. The 
inclusion of criminal history in the Guidelines as a principal factor in the 
recommended sentence is often viewed as the Commission’s proxy to 
adjudge dangerousness.171  
                                                 
169 See resources cited supra note 43. 
170 It is of particular note that judges candidly admitted the role of dismissed and 
acquitted conduct in their decisions to upwardly depart in one out of 12 (8%) cases. This 
finding might be of concern to critics of the real offense system in which individuals are 
penalized for conduct that is not the subject of conviction. Critics may be even more offended 
by increases in punishment for acquitted conduct. Here, it is not possible to tell exactly what 
percentage of those cases represented acquitted conduct, but it is likely that acquitted conduct 
played a role in at least some of them. These 8% of upward departure cases may also imply 
there are instances in which judges are countering plea bargaining to the extent that some 
percentage of these cases may represent increased penalties due to offenses dismissed as part 
of plea bargain deals. Perhaps this reflects judges acting as a check on prosecutorial authority 
in cases in which they view the plea bargains as overly lenient. 
171 MARJORIE A. MEYERS, CRIMINAL HISTORY: CALCULATION AND VARIANCE 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-
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Regarding future risk as a focal concern, other reasons in Table 4 more 
directly address dangerousness. The inclusion of the character of the 
defendant within the second ranking reason may well include assessments of 
past antisocial behavior as reflective of future risk. Ranked fifth in the top 
reasons given, the need to protect the public, clearly a future risk rationale, 
represented 41% of the upward departures. In sum, the relevance of the focal 
concern of future risk to severity in sentences is strongly confirmed in the 
data. 
The multilevel results concerning offense type likewise provide 
interesting information about compliance with Guidelines’ proportionality 
judgments. The dummy series for offense type indicated that all other offense 
types, except for immigration offenses, were more likely to receive upwards 
departures than drug cases as the comparator. This implies that district judges 
as a general rule tend to believe the Guidelines are sufficiently punitive for 
drug offenses and immigration offenses. As drug and immigration cases 
combined are the bulk of federal sentencing in percentage terms, this 
particularly result situate the Guidelines in a positive light in terms of 
proportionality, at least with respect to generally being sufficiently punitive 
for a majority of crimes. However, the greater likelihood of upward 
departures for violent and firearms offenses implies that the judges may 
perceive the Guidelines as insufficiently punitive in those cases. 
Moving onto the impact of extralegal variables, demographic 
characteristics presented with some expected results, while others were more 
surprising. There was support for gender leniency as women were far less 
likely to receive upward departures than men at the individual case level. 
Plus, gender leniency for women did not vary among districts, even after 
controlling for a host of other variables. This was the case even though gender 
is an extralegal factor and a prohibited rationale for sentencing outcomes per 
the Guidelines. Overall, then, the results indicate gender disparities, possibly 
even gender discrimination in favor of women, in upward departures. 
Contrary to many studies, the results here indicate there was no 
individual-level minority discrimination in upward departure decisions. 
While the odds for minorities were 5% greater than whites, the result was not 
statistically significant. Indeed, minority status was the weakest individual 
predictor overall.172 A reason that this result is inconsistent with other 
research finding disparities for minorities may be the greater number of 
explanatory variables in this model and its ability to parse district-level 
variations. Indeed, the random effect was significant, indicating that minority 
status matters more in at least some districts. Plus, within one standard 
                                                 
seminar/2012/3_Criminal_History-Calculation_and_Variance.pdf (presentation at U.S. 
Sent’g Comm’n Annual Training Conference). 
172 This result derives from F statistic comparisons. 
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deviation, the results indicate there are some districts in which minority status 
is positively correlated with upward departures, despite numerous controls. 
Hence, it remains possible that there is explicit or implicit minority 
discrimination in some regions regarding upward departures, though not 
throughout the country.  
It was surprising that noncitizenship was not a positive predictor of 
upward departures. Perhaps the explanation for the statistically greater 
likelihood of United States citizens to receive upward departures is that 
(according to a supplemental data analysis) two-thirds of the noncitizens in 
federal sentencing during the period of study (fiscal 2008-2015) were 
immigration offenders. Noncitizen immigration violators are likely to be 
subject to deportation. Deportation as an incapacitating gesture may impact 
an assessment of future risk at least regarding the danger to U.S. residents. 
Thus, it is possible that for noncitizen immigration offenders, prosecutors 
typically did not request upward departures in those cases and/or judges may 
have perceived them as unnecessary because of the deportation option. Still, 
the random effect of citizenship was statistically significant, indicating that 
the strength of the effect of citizenship significantly varied between districts. 
At two standard deviations, the effect of noncitizenship shows that it is 
actually positive (i.e., noncitizens were at higher odds of upward departures) 
in at least some districts.  
No age leniency was observed at least to the extent it means less 
punishment for older offenders. Indeed, those age 50 and above were more 
likely to receive an upward departure and, like gender, the strength of the 
effect did not vary across districts. This could be evidence of a policy dispute 
with the Commission’s rule that age should typically not be a relevant 
sentencing factor. An alternative explanation, and one more likely 
considering the existence of other studies affirming age leniency,173 relates to 
the results for criminal history previously discussed. The Guidelines 
computation of criminal history points contain statute of limitations-types of 
provisions in which dated offenses are excluded.174 Simply by virtue of their 
age, older offenders would be more likely to have offenses far in the past that 
would be subject to the time bar. In addition, the Guidelines do not count 
certain types of convictions, such as convictions by military, tribal, and 
foreign courts and those that resulted in diversion.175 Older offenders would 
obviously have a longer opportunity to rack up more convictions by various 
entities. Altogether, the results strongly indicate that many judges may 
disagree with such policies for criminal history and thus deviate upward as a 
result, which would more severely impact older offenders.   
                                                 
173 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
174 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 4A1.2(d), (3). 
175 Id. at § 4A1.2(f)-(i). 
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In terms of case-processing variables, the failure to find a trial penalty at 
level-1 is inconsistent with much other research.176 However, the result here 
at the individual defendant level is explained by the presence of the 
acceptance of responsibility variable. Without controlling for the acceptance 
of responsibility, a previously run multilevel model (with the other predictor 
variables in Table 3) showed a statistically significant trial penalty factor. 
Once the acceptance of responsibility variable was input, the significance of 
the trial penalty vanished. Still, the random effects coefficient was 
significant, and at one standard deviation, the results indicate a trial penalty 
in at least some districts, which is in line with prior research.  
As the last predictor variable to be discussed, custody status was the 
strongest factor in elevating the odds of an upward departure among the 
predictor variables.177 This result affirms that outcomes at sentencing are not 
entirely independent of decisions at earlier stages in the prosecution process. 
A denial of pre-trial bail is likely a proxy that influences stronger focal 
concerns concerning the defendant’s culpability for the current offense and 
greater potential for future dangerousness. Being held in custody through 
sentencing as a positive predictor of an upward departure was consistent 
across at least 95% of districts.  
The third focal concern should also be mentioned regarding consequences 
of the penalty. Several of the top reasons judges indicated on the Statement 
of Reasons for upward departures (listed in Table 4) implicate external 
consequences. The third highest ranking justification includes respect for the 
law, which likely entails respect by the defendant individually and more 
broadly. The fourth reason cites a general deterrence function as a reason for 
the upward departure, being triggered in 43% of cases. Both reasons reflect 
upon the consequences of the penalty in its deterring potential offenders and 
community safety. Another community consequence present among the top 
ten reasons relates to the rehabilitation of the offender. The frequency of the 
rehabilitation motive to justify an upward departure, present in 9% of cases, 
is curious as federal law specifically dictates that “imprisonment is not an 
appropriate means of promoting correction or rehabilitation.”178 The data do 
not provide an explanation for the seeming contradiction. Yet it is still 
relevant as reflecting thoughts toward returning more conforming defendants 
to their local communities. 
Additional evidence exists that upward departure decisions are quite often 
about proportionality concerns. Rounding out the top ten reasons listed for 
upward departures are two categories that expressly indicate judicial 
perceptions that the Guidelines have gaps. Judges cited general guideline 
                                                 
176 See supra text and sources accompanying notes 127-129. 
177 This result derives from F statistic comparisons 
178 18 U.S.C. §3582(a). 
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issues or general adequacy issues in up to 10% of upward departure cases.  
3. District Disparities on Individual Predictors 
The third broad research question queried whether district courts vary 
from each other in the extent to which they weigh each of the legal, extralegal, 
and case-processing factors when issuing upward departures. The results 
found numerous such variations, as has already been partly covered when 
discussing the second research question. Overall, significant random effects 
were observed for all but two of the predictor variables (excluding offense 
type which could not be modeled as random effects). The strengths of the 
effect of leniency for women and the lack of lenience for older offenders were 
consistent across districts. In contrast, minority status and the trial penalty, 
which were not statistically significant in individual cases (after controlling 
for other variables), achieved significance in their random effects. In general, 
these random effect results support the courtroom communities’ perspective 
which theoretically accounts for different regional sentencing patterns. To 
cite two examples, criminal history score and U.S. citizenship were both 
significant positive predictors of upward departures in individual cases, yet 
they also held significant random effects, meaning that their relationship to 
upward departures varied between districts. Moreover, standard deviation 
computations indicated that criminal history and the citizenship effect were 
actually negative predictors in some regions. 
The discussion shall end on an empirical note. Overall, the results provide 
strong reinforcement for modeling sentencing decisions with both fixed and 
random effects in a multi-level model to observe individual- and group-based 
factors. The statistical significance of multiple explanatory variables in fixed 
and random effects is itself informative. Then it is also of practical and 
empirical import that the statistical significance of four variables posed 
contrasts between their fixed and random effects. In sum, females and age 
over 50 were statistically significant at their fixed effects, with females and 
defendants under age 50 far less likely to be issued upward departures 
(controlling for other explanatory factors). However, there were no 
significant random effects for those two variables, meaning that the leniency 
to females and the lack of leniency for those over 50 years-of-age were 
consistent between districts. The fixed and random effects for two other 
variables were in the opposite directions. Minority status and going to trial, 
indicated no significant fixed effects, but their random effects were 
significant. For minorities and the trial penalty, this means that there are at 
least a few districts in which minority status is correlated with upward 
departures and that the trial penalty exists to some extent in at least some 
districts. The mixed multilevel model employed here was uniquely able to 
parse those contrasts between individual-level and group-level effects for 
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these four explanatory variables. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article provided an original empirical study of a discretionary 
sentencing outcome that leads to more severe sentences. The results show 
that the focal concerns of culpability, risk, and consequences are significantly 
relevant to upward departure decisions. Legal and case processing factors 
regarding these focal concerns are predictive of upward departures and 
typically in the direction anticipated. The surprising result here was that while 
higher criminal history score increases the likelihood of an upward departure, 
the Guidelines offense severity measure produces the opposite effect. A 
likely explanation is evidence that Guidelines as a general rule offer 
sufficiently or overly punitive recommendations regarding offense severity. 
Yet for criminal history, the exclusion of various past crimes in the official 
Guidelines calculations insufficiently values past antisocial behavior.  
It was also of interest that the trial penalty, relevant to culpability and 
case-processing consequences, is not evident at the individual case level. The 
explanation is the inclusion of the acceptance of responsibility factor which 
mediates the trial penalty as a predictor across individual cases. Still, the 
random effects results also indicate that there exists a trial penalty in at least 
some districts, even with the acceptance of responsibility variable. 
The results confirm that extralegal variables impact non-Guidelines 
sentences. Leniency for women is strongly supported and systematic, being 
significant and present across districts. The effect defies the Guidelines 
policy prohibition consideration of gender. For those who believe gender 
disparities equal gender discrimination, these results suggest such 
discriminatory practices. An age effect exists with older age (operationalized 
as 50 years) being more likely to receive upward departures and, like gender, 
it was systematically present.  
No minority effect is observed at the individual level, though the random 
effects indicates its presence in at least some districts, even with multiple 
controls variables. Thus, the study finds some racial/ethnic disparities which 
might constitute implicit or explicit discrimination in some regions. The 
failure to find that minority status as a consistent predictor of more severe 
sentences in this study could be due to the multitude of variables measured 
as fixed and random effects. In turn, citizenship produces an odd result with 
U.S. citizens more likely to receive upward departures. This result is likely 
due to the deportation option for non-citizens who commit crimes. On the 
other hand, this rationale appears to challenge the Guidelines policy that 
national origin should never be relevant. 
Overall, the study suggests reasons for individual disparities in federal 
sentencing. Likely these embody a mix of warranted and unwarranted 
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disparities, depending upon how one defines and values those terms. The 
research demonstrates the existence and salience of regional disparities, as 
well. The multilevel mixed model was able to parse differences between 
district courts concerning the impact of various legal and extralegal 
explanatory factors. The results indicate that while gender and age reflect 
systematic effects, districts vary significantly in their judgment about the 
relevance of the other predictor factors on upward departure decisions. These 
variations are consistent with the courtroom workgroup perspective. The 
results also support the observation that federal courts do not necessarily 
exhibit a singular culture, share an affinity toward the reasonableness of 
Guidelines recommendations, or regard national uniformity as the primary 
goal in sentencing.  
This Article contributes to the empirical legal studies literature regarding 
sentencing practices. It may likewise be helpful more broadly to stakeholders 
and researchers across criminal justice contexts. The theoretical, policy, and 
empirical offerings herein may inform about more modernized ways to 
conceptualize, shape, and study criminal justice outcomes. The study further 
provides more data in the overall debate about the divergent values of 
disparity and uniformity. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
This Appendix contains additional information about the practical 
benefits and statistical specifications for multi-level models. It provides the 
results of several null models (i.e., before explanatory variables were 
included), further explains some of the independent factors that were 
transformed in the full model provided in the text of this Article, and 
discusses why certain other variables were tested yet excluded from the final 
model. 
 
The Limitations of Single-Level Regression Models 
 
Most sophisticated research on sentencing outcomes utilizes single-level 
regression analysis. While these types of regressions have confirmed values 
in being able to test the effect of each independent variable in the model while 
holding constant other variables, there may be an empirical flaw to be 
recognized in a single-level design as applied to certain datasets. A statistical 
presumption of a single-level regression model is that the outcomes are 
independent from one another.179 Applying this presumption to a study on 
federal sentencing, like the one presented in this paper, it would mean that a 
single-level regression model’s imperative would be that the impact of, say 
criminal history score as an example, on the penalty outcome is the same for 
every defendant, no matter where he or she is sentenced. However, that 
assumption is likely invalid. Instead, defendants sentenced in the same 
district court likely share some correlated characteristics. As an illustration, 
districts at the border of Mexico address a disproportionate percentage of 
Hispanic defendants committing immigration crimes compared to nonborder 
districts.180 The impact of a computed criminal history score on sentences in 
border districts may vary from other regions simply because border district 
judges may be aware that official criminal history in foreign countries may 
not be available in domestic records.181 Thus, judges facing large numbers of 
noncitizen defendants may account for the lack of available criminal history 
information in other ways, thereby skewing the impact of the Guidelines 
criminal history score on the outcome in those districts as compared to non-
                                                 
179 Peter C. Austin et al., An Introduction to Multilevel Regression Models, 92 
CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 50, 50 (2001). 
180 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY CASES 8 (2015). 
181 Michael T. Light, Michael Massoglia, & Ryan D. King, Citizenship and Punishment: 
The Salience of National Membership in U.S. Criminal Courts, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 4 (Online 
Supp. 2014). Foreign convictions are not formally counted in the official Guidelines criminal 
history calculation but they may be considered for purposes of upwardly departing because 
the official calculation underestimates the true criminal background. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINE MANUAL § 4A1.2(h). 
Draft]             7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) 47 
border districts.  
Defendants within individual districts are more likely to share 
sociodemographic characteristics than with defendants in other districts 
because of the tendency in at least some parts of the United States to be more 
heterogenic in their populations. Traditional regression models unfortunately 
tend to ignore these kinds of correlations between defendants sentenced in 
the same jurisdiction.  
In addition, the theory of courtroom communities is relevant. Sentences 
of defendants in the same district may be more correlated because they share 
the same courtroom cultures and sentencing judges than they are correlated 
with sentences issued in other districts exhibiting different cultures and 
judges. These group-based factors, resulting from individuals nested in 
districts, may also impact sentencing outcomes.  
The statistical issue, then, when criminal defendants are nested in a higher 
level, such as district courts in the federal context, is that assuming that 
penalty outcomes for the dependent variable are independent from the higher 
level may be erroneous.182 In such a case, the single-level regression model’s 
assumption of independence of outcomes may be violated, rendering results 
that may produce biased estimates and misestimate standard errors.183 
Importantly, there is now available a sophisticated statistical procedure that 
can address these concerns when data is nested—multilevel modeling. In 
sum, “the utility of multilevel models lies in their capacity to aggregate cases 
by group membership and to test simultaneously for individual and group 
effects on the dependent variable.”184 
 
The Benefits of Multi-Level Regression Models 
 
Multilevel analyses, when suitable for the data, are able to provide 
numerous benefits over single-level regression models. First, multilevel 
methods can account for the lack of independence when individuals are 
nested in groups.185 Multilevel modeling does not assume that the impact of 
an explanatory variable is the same across groups. Instead, multilevel models 
can be specified to account for between-group variability in explanatory 
variables and residuals.186 Second, the methodology is preferable to simply 
                                                 
182 Noelle E. Fearn, A Multilevel Analysis of Community Effects on Criminal Sentencing, 
22 JUST. Q. 452, 457 (2005). 
183 Austin et al., supra note 179, at 50. A violation of the assumption of independence 
can produce Type 1 errors. James L. Peugh, A Practical Guide to Multilevel Modeling, 48 J. 
SCHOOL PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2010).  
184 Weidner et al., supra note 99, at 410. 
185 Id. (noting in single-level regressions the lack of independence may exaggerate the 
significance of the parameter estimate). 
186 Brian D. Johnson, Cross-Classified Multilevel Models: An Application to the 
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controlling for the group-level effect as can be done in a single-level 
regression model. Multilevel modeling can simultaneously test the effects of 
both individual and group explanatory variables on the outcome of interest.187 
A multilevel model is able to indicate whether the individual-based 
explanatory factors impact the outcome variable while also indicating how 
group characteristics affect the relationships between the individual factors 
and the outcome of interest.188  
Third, multilevel models are not limited to two levels; they can 
accommodate additional levels. As an illustration, multilevel regressions are 
popular in educational research where students are nested in classrooms 
which are nested in schools. The current challenge of including multiple 
levels is the substantial increase in computer resource capacity that is 
necessary to run a model with numerous explanatory factors included. An 
attractive feature is that there need not be the same number of units at each 
level. Nor must the levels be strictly hierarchical in nature. They may merely 
be nested. Thus, a multilevel model can be cross-level, such as defendants 
nested in years and nested in districts. Such a design would account, then, for 
both annual and regional variables.  
Fourth, multilevel models partition the overall variance in the outcome of 
interest among the levels of analysis (e.g., at the individual level and then at 
the group level). The result indicates how much of the variation in the 
outcome is accounted for by the grouping. 
 
Step One: Running the Null Model 
 
The initial step in a multilevel model project is to run a null model. The 
null model is also referred to as an unconditional model because it has no 
explanatory factors included. The purpose is to statistically obtain the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (“ICC”) to determine if multilevel modeling 
is appropriate for the data. The ICC provides the proportion of the total 
variance in the outcome that is accounted for by the clustering at the nested 
group level. In other words, for purposes of this study, the statistic is a 
measure of how much of the differences in upward departure decisions are 
attributable to variations in district court practices. If the ICC indicates that 
intraclass correlation exists with statistical significance, the assumption of 
                                                 
Criminal Case Processing of Indicted Terrorists, 28 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 163, 171 
(2012). 
187 Fearn, supra note 182, at 468. In even more technical terms, “multilevel techniques 
take into account variance at both the individual and group levels, thus allowing intercepts 
and slope coefficients for selected variables to vary across groups.” Stephen R. Porter & Paul 
D. Umbach, Analyzing Faculty Workload Data Using Multilevel Modeling, 42 RES. HIGHER 
EDUC. 171, 177 (2001). 
188 Porter & Umbach, supra note 187, at 178. 
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independence required by the single-level regression model may be rejected 
and the data are appropriate for multilevel modeling.189 Still, even if the ICC 
shows statistical significance, if it is not practically significant, the researcher 
can still reasonably decline to model that level. Multilevel analysis with 
numerous explanatory variables to test requires complex algorithmic 
processing. An ICC that provides a statistically significant, though practically 
small, proportional variance may convince the researcher that the ability to 
include more explanatory variables at the lower levels may outweigh any 
interest in retaining the practically unimportant variation at that nested 
level.190  
 
Three-Level Null Models for the Upward Departure Dataset 
 
Multilevel models, like single-level regression models, are commonly 
tested on continuous dependent variables. But when the outcome of interest 
is binary in nature, different modeling must be employed because a binary 
dependent variable means that the normal assumptions of a normally 
distributed response variable and homoscedatic errors are violated.191 In the 
study presented herein, the outcome of interest is binary, being whether an 
upward departure was ordered (or not). Statistical techniques can be 
employed to transform such a binary outcome to achieve normality and 
reduce heteroscedasticity, typically through the logit function,192 as was used 
herein. 
A statistical model to fit data with a binary dependent variable is called a 
generalized linear model with three components: (1) a linear regression 
equation, (2) a specific error distribution, and (3) a nonlinear link function 
that transforms the predicted values for the dependent variable to the 
observed values.193  
For the study herein, the binary response variable for the ith defendant in 
district j, is: 
 
Yij ൜
1 for upward departure         
0 for no upward departure    
 
                                                 
189 J. Kyle Roberts, An Introductory Primer on Multilevel and Hierarchical Linear 
Models, 2 LEARNING DISABILITIES 30, 32 (2004).  
190 Tom A.B. Snijders, Fixed and Random Effects, in ENCYLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS IN 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 664, 665 (Brian S. Everitt & David C. Howell eds., 2005). At times, 
there is a give-and-take between resource capabilities and theoretical interests. 
191 Joop J. Hox & Cora J.M. Maas, Multilevel Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL 
MEASUREMENT 785, 790 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., vol. 2, 2005). 
192 Id..  
193 Id. 
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The transformation of the dichotomous dependent variable for an upward 
departure presented herein utilizes the logit link function. 
 
ηij=  ݈݊ ቀ
௣
ଵି௣
ቁ     Logit Link Function194 
 
In the logit link function, the Greek letter eta (η) represents the 
transformed linear predictor. Exponentiating the resulting η parameter 
provides the odds ratio. The p is the probability of the outcome occurring and 
the denominator (1 – p) is the probability of the outcome not occurring. The 
equation represents the odds of the outcome.  
At the outset of this study, it was considered that a three-level model 
might be appropriate considering district courts are nested within the higher 
level circuit courts of appeal and/or within years, with the latter perhaps 
accounting for changes in sentencing patterns over time and using annual 
time periods as the temporal division.  
A few statistical notes should be briefly mentioned before addressing the 
models. The software utilized for the study presented herein, including the 
three-level models that follow, was SPSS version 23. Further, there is no 
issue of selection bias and therefore no need for the so-called Heckman 
correction. Selection bias may occur when the researcher obtains data from a 
non-random sub-sample of the population of interest.195 The relevant 
population of interest in this paper is federal defendants sentenced in the 
federal system during the period of study. The data analyses included herein 
were not limited to some sub-sample of that population. 
In any event, the specification for a three-level null model is as follows: 
 
ηij = β0jk    Level-1  
β0jk = γ00k + μ0jk   Level-2  
γ00k = γ000 + μ00k  Level-3196 
 
It was of interest, then, to test for whether the final model ought to account 
for serious nesting patterns which may introduce bias from the circuit courts 
of appeal as Level-3. The initial step in creating a multilevel model with three 
levels is to estimate the null model, which is provided in Table 5.  
                                                 
194 RONALD H. HECK ET AL., MULTILEVEL MODELING OF CATEGORICAL OUTCOMES 
USING IBM SPSS 151 (2012). 
195 Shawn Bushway et al., Is the Magic Still There? The Use of the Heckman Two-Step 
Correction for Selection Bias in Criminology, J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (2007). 
196 HECK ET AL., supra note 194, at 183. 
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Table 5. Null Model for Upward Departures with Districts Nested in Circuits 
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
b 
-3.934 
S.E. 
.087*** 
 
Random Effects 
Level-1 
Level-2 
Level-3 
s2 
3.29 
   .250 
   .060 
S.E. 
 
.042*** 
 .162 
ρ 
 
6.94% 
1.67% 
 
-2LL=4324243 
n=623,947 
   
*** p < .001 
 
From Table 5 it is estimated that 7% of the variation in upward departures 
is between district courts and almost 2% of the variation is between circuit 
courts of appeal. The ICC was statistically significant for Level-2 district 
courts, yet was not significant for the Level-3 circuit courts. Practically, it 
was not surprising that there was not shown to be statistical significance with 
circuit courts. An earlier scan of bivariate data for the proportion of upward 
departures in the districts did not reveal consistencies for districts nested in 
circuits. Instead, the circuits tended to encompass a mix of low and high use 
of upward departures within their nested districts. For example, while three 
of the districts within the Fifth Circuit yielded the highest proportions of 
upward departures (Northern District of Texas at 6.5%, Western District of 
Louisiana at 5.7%, and Eastern District of Louisiana at 4.8%), the Fifth 
Circuit also included one district with a below-average rate of upward 
departures (Southern District of Texas at 1.5%). Overall, the Fifth Circuit 
ranked as the fifth highest among the 12 circuits in its total proportion of 
upward departures. The First Circuit ranked first overall, with a total of 3.3% 
of sentences with upward departures. But the First Circuit also presented with 
vastly different practices within its district court outcomes, as well. Most of 
the upward departures in the First Circuit were issued in the District of Puerto 
Rico (at 4.4%), yet this circuit also included the District of Rhode Island 
which issued one of the lowest rates of upward departures (at 0.5%).  
While circuit court variation was not statistically significant, it 
alternatively was likely that there might be variations by time. Thus, a three-
level null model was run for district courts nested in fiscal years, which is 
presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Null Model for Upward Departures for Districts Nested in Years 
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
b 
-3.937 
S.E. 
.057*** 
 
Random Effects 
Level-1 
Level-2 
Level-3 
s2 
3.29  
   .282 
   .093 
S.E. 
 
 .046***   
.010*** 
 
ρ 
 
7.69% 
2.54% 
n=623,947    
*** p < .001 
 
This null model with district courts nested in fiscal years demonstrated 
that 8% of the variation in upward departures is between district courts. It 
was also found that there is a statistically significant variation with Level-3 
being an annual indicator. Yet, for several reasons, the nesting of upward 
departure outcomes at a level with years was dropped to proceed with a more 
developed two-level model. The ICC for years was, in practical terms, 
indicating a low degree of variation by year at less than 3%. As multiple 
explanatory variables were expected to be included in the final model with 
both fixed and random effects, a three-level model including years would 
present as an extremely complicated model from a computing resource 
perspective. Indeed, as will be indicated below, even in a two-level design 
with district courts at the higher grouping, the final model had to be curtailed 
a bit because of convergence issues when attempting to model all 
independent variables as both fixed and random effects. An additional 
concern is that there were only 8 groups involved for years (i.e., eight 
consecutive fiscal years), an extremely low number for multilevel modeling 
purposes. In any event, as a primary interest for this study was regional 
variations in discretionary sentencing decisions, the Level-3 variation with 
years was dropped. Still, the three-level model indicated in Table 6 was 
presented herein for informational purposes. 
 
The Two-Level Null Model for the Upward Departure Dataset 
 
As the three-level designs just summarized were vetoed, a null model 
with two levels to account for nesting in districts could be run. The null model 
for two-level design with a dichotomous dependent is specified with the 
following equations.  
 
ηij = β0j     Level-1 Null Model 
β0j = γ00 + μ0j    Level-2 Null Model 
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In these null models for this study, the term β0j is the intercept, which is 
the average log odds of an upward departure in group j. At Level-2, the term 
γ00 represents the fixed intercept, being the log odds of an upward departure 
in a typical district for the average individual. The variance parameter μ0j is 
the random intercept and signifies the variability of the outcome across 
Level-2 groups.197  
In a generalized linear multilevel model using a logit link because of a 
binary response variable, the Level-1 residuals are assumed to follow the 
standard logistic distribution, with a mean of 0 and a variance (ߪො2) set to π2/3, 
which is equal to 3.29. For a dichotomous outcome, the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (i.e., a statistic that indicates the proportion of total variability in 
outcomes which arises at the higher level) is computed in a two-level model 
as: 
 
    τ00             Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) 
τ00 + 3.29 
 
The term τ00 represents the between-group variance at Level-2.198  
Table 7 provides for the null model results for upward departures where 
Level-1 are individual defendants and Level-2 are district courts. Table 7 is 
the basis for the final model contained in Table 3 in the main body of this 
Article. 
Table 7. Null Model for Upward Departures Nested in Districts 
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
b 
-3.921 
S.E. 
.058*** 
 
Random Effects 
Level-1 
Level-2 
s2 
3.29   
.301 
S.E. 
--- 
.047*** 
ρ 
 
8.38% 
 
-2LL=4324129 
n=623,947 
   
*** p < .001 
 
The ICC computed for the two-level null model means that 8% of the 
variability in upward departures is accounted for by districts.199 This result is 
relatively within the bounds of other studies of federal sentencing. The other 
research that report on the partition of variance results typically find that 
                                                 
197 HECK ET AL., supra note 194, at 151. 
198 Id. at 94. 
199 This leaves 92% of the variability to be accounted for at the individual case level (or 
other unknown factors). 
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between 4 and 12% of the variance in sentence length was accounted for at 
the districts level, with the exactly percentage depending on the period 
studied, the crimes included, and when reporting full models, the control 
variables used.200  
As expected from the courtroom communities’ perspective, the Level-2 
random effect is significant at the .001 level, which indicates that the 
probability of an upward departure significantly varies between districts. 
Indeed, in a separate analysis to compare district means, wide variation in 
proportions were observed. The proportion of upward departures at the 
district court level ranges from a low of 0.5% (Northern District of 
Oklahoma, District of New Mexico, and District of Rhode Island) to a high 
of 6.5% (Northern District of Texas). Thus, the district with the greatest 
proportion of upward departures is more than twelve times that of the district 
with the lowest percentage, indicating a stark district level differential. 
The intercept in the two-level null model represents an estimate that can 
be converted to the overall probability of an upward departure. The random 
effect represents the degree to which the outcome varies across federal 
districts. The estimated probability of a defendant receiving an upward 
departure in the average district is approximately 2%.201  
Once the researcher chooses the null model with the appropriate higher 
level(s), the researcher can add explanatory factors. In a very simple model, 
we can add a Level-1 explanatory variable and a Level-2 predictor, such as 
the following equation illustrates. 
 
ηij = β0j + β1jX1ij    Level-1 
β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj + μ0j   Level-2 
β1j = γ10 + μ1j 
 
Now γ00 is the log odds that the outcome = 1 when explanatory variable 
X = 0 and μ = 0. β1 is the log odds effect that the outcome is = 1 for every 
one unit increase in the variable X in group j. To get a more interpretable 
result for the effect of X, we can exponentiate β1 to obtain the odds ratio to 
compare the odds for individuals spaced one unit apart on X. Then Wj 
represents the random effect of that predictor variable in group j. 
                                                 
200 Light, Noncitizens, supra note 120, at 462 (4% variance in length of sentence and 5% 
in sentences requiring incarceration); Lynch & Omori, supra note 104, at 429 (11% for drug 
trafficking crimes); Feldmeyer & Ulmer, supra note 39, at 250 (7%); Farrell et al., supra 
note 113, at 112 (5% for length of incarceration and 8% of the variance for the odds of 
incarceration was between districts); Albonetti & Baller, supra note 39, at 64 (12% for drug 
trafficking crimes); Kautt, supra note 90, at 653 (7% for drug trafficking crimes). 
201 The formula to obtain the overall expected proportion is an inverse of the logit link 
function: [(1/(1 + e-η)) x 100%]. Plugging in the coefficient for the fixed effect coefficient, 
the formula becomes [(1/(1 + e3.921)) x 100%], which is equal to 1.94%. 
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In this study, the null model with district courts at Level-2 was the choice 
and the independent variables that survived into the final model are provided 
in Table 3 in the main body of the text. In Table 3, the ICC statistic indicates 
that 2% of the overall variance remains with district courts. The intraclass 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant when accounting for multiple 
fixed and random effects. Nonetheless, the substantial reduction in the -2 
Log-Likelihood statistic between the null model and the full model indicates 
a significantly better fit of the full model for this dataset. Further discussion 
on methodological choices along the way to the final model is next. 
 
Transforming Variables and Excluding Factors Regarding the Full Model 
 
Some variables were transformed for the final model as explained below. 
In addition, other factors were tested yet eliminated in the end for the reasons 
ascribed to them herein. 
For purposes of the descriptive statistics in Table 2, the variables for final 
offense level, criminal history, and number of counts are in their original 
metrics. For the multilevel model in Table 3, these three variables are each 
grand mean centered for ease of interpretation as none of them can have zero 
as a real value. In federal sentencing, defendants must have at least one count 
of conviction, the lowest criminal history category is I (i.e., 1), and the 
minimum offense severity level is 1. In a logistic model, the intercept is 
interpreted to mean the value of the outcome when all predictors are equal to 
0. This has no practical meaning for variables that cannot actually have a real 
world value of 0, which is the case for these three variables. Grand mean 
centering is the statistical convention for adjusting the metrics to have a more 
interpretable intercept in such a case. 
The number of counts (of conviction) variable was transformed for 
statistical purposes. In the original data, the number of counts variable was 
skewed to the right. This variable was first centered at the grand mean. Then 
to enable a natural log transformation to adjust for the skew and more closely 
approximate a normal distribution, the value of .1 was added to the mean 
centered variable because log transformations are not possible on values of 
0. 
Race/ethnicity was originally coded as dummy variables of black, 
Hispanic, and other, with white as the reference category. In a full multilevel 
model with such coding with all fixed effects, the only statistically significant 
result was for the category of other as compared to whites. This result is 
practically meaningless because the grouping of “other” includes a 
heterogeneous mix of native Alaskan, native American, non-U.S. American 
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Indians, Asian, Pacific Islander, multi-racial, and a smaller subset of other.202 
In addition, SPSS could not properly compute a random effect for this 
variable with this coding scheme involving three dummy variables. As 
race/ethnicity is such an important topic of interest in criminal justice, it 
seemed more worthwhile to recode the variable as a single dichotomous 
factor in order to incorporate a race-based variable in the formula and to be 
able to model it with both fixed and random effects. 
The full model includes all 94 district courts. This is mentioned because 
many studies that incorporate district courts in their variables exclude the 
districts that are in the U.S. territories (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, 
North Mariana Islands). These researchers argue the territories are viewed as 
different because states enjoy greater rights than them and, thus, the inclusion 
of the territories may introduce nonrandom bias.203 However, other experts 
challenge the assumption of substantive differences between districts courts 
within the states and those in the territories.204 Indeed, researchers in at least 
one study found far more similarities than differences in sentencing 
outcomes, except that the districts in the territories tended to be more 
punitive.205 These researchers further contend that excluding the territories 
actually may do more harm by not portraying an accurate picture of the 
salience of the Guidelines and judicial compliance with them from a national 
perspective.206 I determined it was preferable to include the territories for 
similar reasons. 
The general offense type was excluded from the random effects due to 
the complexity of the algorithm necessary to compute a multilevel model 
with them included. In other words, the model with the offense type having 
random effects was overly complicated for computational iterations, resulting 
in a failure of convergence. Convergence was achieved after excluding 
offense types at Level-2, while still retaining their Level-1 fixed effects.  
It is noted that four additional independent variables were tested but 
removed before the final model for reasons of parsimony and specific 
statistical challenges. The applicability of a mandatory minimum statute was 
not statistically significant (at the .001 level) at Level-1 in any model and thus 
was removed as there was no theoretical justification to retain it as a factor in 
a study on upward departure outcomes. A variable tied to the Guidelines-
recommended sentence was removed because of multicollinearity concerns 
                                                 
202 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS 31 
(2015). 
203 E.g., Farrell et al., supra note 113, at 103 n. 75; Kautt, supra note 90, at 648. See also 
Light, Noncitizens, supra note 120, at 456 (excluding the territories without stating reason). 
204 Gail Iles et al., U.S. Territorial Exclusion in Federal Sentencing Research: Can it be 
Justified?, 3 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC. 113, 113 (2014). 
205 Id. at 122. 
206 Id. at 113. 
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with the final offense level and criminal history score variables. Notably, all 
independent variables attempted in any model were tested for 
multicollinearity. For the independent variables retained and shown in the 
final model in Table 3, results indicated no significant collinearity problems. 
All variance inflation factor scores resided within an acceptable level (VIFs 
< 3). A variable regarding the guideline recommended sentence had 
previously triggered multicollinearity concerns (with some VIFs greater than 
5) and was therefore removed.  
A series of dummy variables to distinguish fiscal years of sentencing were 
also dropped. While the annual rates of upward departures were statistically 
significant compared to 2008 as the dummy, the overall statistical impact 
(according to F statistic results) on explaining upward variances for the 
timing factor was among the weakest among the various explanatory 
variables. The statistical resources necessary to account for the seven dummy 
variables for years did not then seem worthwhile.  
Another variable was tested and also dropped. No statistically significant 
effects of education level on upward departures were observed in any tested 
model. Without any pressing need to focus on educational level as it does not 
represent the most egregious type of discriminatory category, it was 
discarded as an explanatory factor.  
As a final methodological note, the results here may advise other 
researchers that it might be preferable to model the main Guidelines proxies 
for crime severity and criminal background with the two separate factors of 
final offense level and final criminal history category, respectively, rather 
than their combination as indicated by the Guidelines’ minimum sentence 
recommendation. As shown herein, the two variables may actually have the 
opposite effect on the outcome of interest, which would unfortunately be 
indiscernible when using the minimum sentence combination instead. 
